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ABSTRACT 
This thesis seeks to explain what hinders former neutral- and non-aligned nations 
from fully integrating themselves into such collective security regimes as NATO, the EU 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, and UN Peace Support Operations:  What delays 
or denies such states from joining?  When they do join, what keeps them from providing 
more than token material or personnel contributions to alliances?  Examining three 
geographically close but historically distinct cases, the Republics of Austria, Croatia and 
Montenegro, this work assesses the commonalities and idiosyncrasies in their 
relationships with those collective security regimes.  Each case study examines five 
characteristics that influence national acceptance of collective security:  history, 
government objectives, public attitudes, defense structures and operations.  The study 
arrives at three conclusions.    First, though geographically close, the three countries have 
substantial differences in their historical, official and popular definitions of national 
security.  These differences strongly influence the way national leaders and the voting 
public views individual collective security regimes such as the UN, NATO and the EU.  
Second, the three nations’ historical and current experience suggests that proponents of 
collective security should engage partner nations based on a more precise understanding 
of national security objectives.  It further concludes that neither the NATO nor EU 
visions for European collective security accurately captures what motivates these three 
states to join and to support collective security regimes. 
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This thesis analyzes the experience of three North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries to identify the factors that most influence 
their adaptation of an international security cooperation mindset.  Freed from their Cold 
War geopolitical constraints, and facing a host of trans-national security threats, the 
nations of Central Europe have strong incentives to forge security partnerships and 
formalize their working relationships with collective security organizations.  Yet despite 
15 years of reform, major structural, legal and political impediments to security and 
defense cooperation remain.  Some states hesitate to join alliances.  Others eagerly seek 
membership in NATO and the European Union, yet simultaneously resist participation in 
the very activities that would provide the enhanced security that motivated them to join in 
the first place.  The objective of this work is to identify the common and idiosyncratic 
sources of such resistance and the limits of a state’s power to overcome them.  
The primary Research Question this thesis seeks to answer is:  What factors most 
inhibit NATO’s Partner nations from fully participating in collective security∗ regimes?  
It addresses a range of such regimes in Southeast Europe, from the most treaty-based and 
compulsory (NATO) to the most informal and voluntary (the Proliferation Security 
Initiative).  In comparing the experiences of Austria, Croatia and Montenegro, it 
identifies common and nation-specific factors that limit the will and the ability of those 
PfP nations to contribute actively to international security alliances.  Identification of 
those factors will require the examination of three subordinate questions: 
                                                 ∗ For a contextual discussion of the definition of “collective security”, its distinction from “collective 
defense” and the political and organizational associations of each, see Dr. David Yost’s “Collective 
Defense and Collective Security after Kosovo” in Rob de Wijk, ed. NATO After Kosovo (Breda: Royal 
Netherlands Military Academy, 2000), 19-43.  To avoid repetition, and for institutional reasons that are 
explained in the Methodology and Conclusions sections, except where required for clarity, this study 
deliberately elides the two concepts together.  The intention here is to address broadly all of the reasons 
these nations would be inclined to seek international partners to enhance their national security.  The 
collective defense mission—alliance against an external threat—thereby becomes but one subset of the 
more broadly defined collective security.   
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1. What is the relative importance of historical experience, tradition, public 
opinion and government intent in these nations’ acceptance of the collective 
security concept? 
2. Do individuals and institutions operate based on coherent concepts of 
“collective security?”  
3. What are the means and limits of government influence over public attitudes 
toward collective security? 
B. IMPORTANCE   
This thesis supports United States and NATO efforts to integrate prospective-
member countries into the Alliance via the Partnership for Peace.  As the controversy in 
2008 over member country roles in Afghanistan indicates, membership in the Alliance 
does not guarantee to full and unconditional support for its operations.  Conversely, some 
countries that have no aspiration to join NATO nevertheless strongly support collective 
security operations under other regimes.  An example of this latter group is the Republic 
of Austria, which presently supports European Union operations in Kosovo and Chad 
with deployments that far exceed those of larger Western European countries, and whose 
per-capita financial contribution to support for the UN far exceeds larger nations.  
Answering this Research Question and its subordinate questions will provide two 
types of information useful to the NATO International Military Staff, Office of the 
Secretary of Defense and Combatant Commanders in their efforts to further integrate PfP 
countries: 
1. internationally comparable criteria to track partner nation progress in the 
adoption of collective security regimes; 
2. information useful in recognizing opportunities for the further expansion of 
collective security agreements. 
In precisely mapping the problems these three countries have faced, this thesis will draw 
general conclusions from their commonalities and identify their relative importance and 
degree of challenge for NATO. 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Context  
This is a work about the relationship between public attitudes, tradition and 
innovation in statecraft.  Although governments in Central and Southeast Europe 
universally claim to support international defense cooperation, the force of public opinion 
often overrules the will of governments to support such cooperation.  At the most formal 
and binding level of collective security regimes—the treaty-based alliance—electoral 
mandates directly steer national policy toward membership.  At the less-binding 
convention level (e.g. the European Police Office, EUROPOL)—public opinion 
commands the resources and determines the bona fides of cooperation and accountability.   
Even at the most informal level of cooperation (voluntary working groups such as the 
Proliferation Security Initiative), public opinion determines national cooperation via press 
scrutiny and legislative inquiries. 
One of the paradoxes of reform in former communist states is that as governments 
have democratized to join NATO they have simultaneously lost their ability to guarantee 
national participation in NATO operations.1  The same holds true for national 
relationships with the EU, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
and other regional security organizations.  Where democratization has preceded 
institutional reform, Defense Ministry and General Staffs have adopted a siege mindset 
and used their political power to forestall substantive change.  Nowhere is this more 
pandemic than in Southeast Europe.  The balkanization of former Yugoslav states into 
regional and ethnic groups is mirrored in their defense institutions.  Austria has certainly 
not followed that course, and an explication of the differences may be instructive for 
other PfP nations.  The challenge of integrating new members into collective security 
 
 
                                                 
1 Wallace J. Thies notes a similar paradox, albeit in reference to democratic reform in Western 
European NATO members, in Friendly Rivals : Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO. Armonk, N.Y: 
M.E. Sharpe, 2003. 
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frameworks cannot be divorced from the challenge of reforming their defense 
institutions.  This thesis will add to the body of work that addresses those conjoined 
challenges.  
2. How This Work Contributes 
This project complements the existing literature regarding the post Cold War 
enlargement of NATO and the EU.  While most previous efforts have focused on the 
institutions themselves as agents of change and integration, this work places its emphasis 
on the internal dynamics of Partnership states.  Where existing works have examined 
enlargement primarily in terms of structures and operations, this project analyzes the 
political objectives and public attitudes that work in parallel with those two criteria.    
In its scope of inquiry, this project makes three contributions to the existing 
literature.  First, it focuses on a set of Alpine-Adriatic countries whose defense reform 
efforts have not previously been compared.  Second, it addresses a broader concept of 
collective security than existing works, which have analyzed only one type of collective 
security organization, the treaty organization.   Third, in its examination of the 
relationship of leadership objectives and public attitudes to defense structures and 
military operations on the other, it will map the extent of government influence in all four 
components of collective security. 
3. Related Works and Arguments 
In the study of national acceptance of collective security among former 
communist and neutral nations, the existing literature is organized into four general 
groups: 
1. International relations theory concerning the role of institutional integration 
in preventing and shaping conflict.  The dominant debate in this group is 
between “neo-liberal institutionalists” and “neo-realists.”  The former, 
including Robert Keohane, argue that the international integration of national 
defense structures through collective security organizations is itself the 
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greatest check against military conflict.2  The latter, such as Robert Krasner, 
counter that collective security integration only occurs to where an 
overwhelming external threat requires it, or if that integration favors the 
interests of a stronger party (e.g. the US in NATO).3  
2. Examinations of international organizations (NATO/EU/UN) as the agents 
of change; 
3. Structural analysis closely linked to logistical interoperability; 
4. Historical/cultural analysis focusing on leadership attitudes and methods;  
 
This study makes use of sources from all four categories, but approaches the 
question from a comparative, institutional perspective.    
Five years ago, University of Texas Professor Zoltan Barany produced a study of 
defense reform and its implications for the Future of NATO Expansion.  In its selection 
of case studies, this thesis meshes like the teeth of a gear with Barany’s work.  His work 
focused on Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania.4  This work addresses Austria, Croatia and 
Montenegro.  Though this work will address a broader cross-section of collective security 
organizations, Barany’s book provides useful comparison both in methodology and 
regional conclusions.  Deni (2007), likewise, informs this analysis in his explanation of 
the “bargaining” process between candidate nations for a NATO Rapid Reaction Force 
and the Alliance’s International Military Staff.5 
A number of works have addressed the specific structural shortcomings of former 
Warsaw Pact militaries engaged in NATO operations.   Jeffrey Simon (2005) examines 
the specific problems of coalition members in Out of Area missions.  His findings 
focused mostly on Human Resource problems of conscript forces and the command and 
                                                 
2  Hemmer,Christopher M.(Christopher Michael) 1969- and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Why is there no 
NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism," International 
Organization 56, no. 3 (2002), 579, 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_organization/v056/56.3hemmer.html (accessed 05 March 2008). 
3  Stephen D. Krasner, "Rethinking the Sovereign State Model," Review of International Studies 27, 
no. 5 (December 2001), 31, 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1410798071&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD 
(accessed 04 March 2008). 
4  Zoltan D. Barany, The Future of NATO Expansion : Four Case Studies (Cambridge, UK ; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 267. 
5  John R. Deni, Alliance Management and Maintenance : Restructuring NATO for the 21st Century 
(Aldershot, Hampshire, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007), 79-84. 
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control incompatibilities of forces whose senior leadership trained under Warsaw Pact 
doctrine.6  Adrian Hyde Pierce (2005) examines the “embedded strategic cultures” that 
define national attitudes toward collective security.  Pierce concludes that European 
leaders, despite an appreciation of the changed of threats, still approach collective 
security with a “collective territorial defense” mindset.7  His analysis and prescriptions 
are primarily appropriate for scrutinizing the operational aspect of collective security. 
The Geneva Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) has studied 
extensively Central and East European nations undergoing defense reform.  These studies 
focus primarily on national reform of defense institutions to facilitate interoperability 
with collective security organizations.  The DCAF studies examine both what legal 
reforms are necessary to allow former communist states to participate in multilateral 
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), and what organizational dynamics tend to resist those 
legal reforms.8  While both the content and cases studies overlap with this thesis, the 
DCAF works have not commented on the relationship between public opinion and 
government objectives in this context. 
D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This project employs a comparative, case study method to answer the primary 
research question.  It examines three NATO Partnership for Peace nations and compares 
them in terms of their engagement with the broad concept of “collective security.”  Each 
case study begins with a review of historical factors that influence national adoption of 
collective security, including historical participation in collective security regimes.  It 
then examines the current national status of collective security in four components:  
Objectives, Attitudes, Structures and Operations. Chapter One defines collective security, 
identifies the work’s objectives, and introduces its comparative methodology.  Chapters 
                                                 
6  National Defense University Washington DC Institute for National Strategic Studies and Jeffrey 
Simon, NATO Expeditionary Operations: Impacts upon New Members and Partners, [2005]). 
7  Kerry Anne Longhurst and Marcin Zaborowski, Old Europe, New Europe and the Transatlantic 
Security Agenda (London; New York: Routledge, 2005), 140. 
8  Pietz, Tobias and Marc Remillard, Defense Reform and Conversion in Albania, Macedonia and 
Croatia (Bonn, Germany: Bonn International Center for Conversion, [2006]). 
http://www.bicc.de/publications/briefs/brief34/content.php (accessed 11 January 2008). 
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Two through Four examine the case studies.  The concluding chapter identifies common 
and idiosyncratic traits in the case studies and draws conclusions regarding the extent of 
government influence over public attitudes toward collective security.  The practical 
objective of this work is to provide theater Foreign Area Officers, Fleet and COCOM 
staffs with a set of criteria they can use to assess partner country progress, set priorities 
for recommended structural reforms and recognize opportunities to capitalize on shifts of 
public opinion.  
The intention of this work is not to focus solely on NATO.  Rather, it examines 
the topic of “collective security” as a general concept that encompasses three types of 
cooperation: 
1. Treaty-based alliances, also known as “Collective Defense” 
organizations;  
2. Law-enforcement collaboration conducted under binding bilateral or 
multilateral Conventions; 
3. Working Groups that rely solely on member country voluntary 
participation.  
 
The three case studies examined, Austria, Croatia and Montenegro, are all 
Partnership for Peace countries that have undergone significant defense reform since the 
collapse of Soviet and Yugoslav communism.  To avoid parochial focus on NATO, these 
case studies have been selected because they represent a range of intentions regarding 
membership:  Austria, with its constitutionally-enshrined policy of neutrality, has 
declared that it will not join NATO, but will actively engage in Partnership arrangements 
with the organization.  Montenegro has declared its intention to join NATO, but public 
support for the organization has recently weakened and polarized.  Croatia represents the 
extreme upper end of government resolve and public support for joining the Alliance 
(which culminated in its April, 2008 Bucharest Summit invitation to join the Alliance), 
but may suffer from structural problems that prevent it from being a full, active 
participant in the NATO.    
The three nations also provide a means to look at the concept of collective 
security more generally because they represent three distinct stages of democratic reform.  
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Montenegro, having achieved independence from Yugoslavia in mid-2006, still 
represents a dominant single-party system.  Croatia has undergone significant democratic 
reforms in its 15 years of independence, but did not have its first election with significant 
minority-party competition until 2000.  Austria’s democratic tradition dates to the end of 
World War II. 
While above differences between the three case studies provide a means to 
address collective security as a general concept, they share some commonalities that will 
aid in the assessment and comparison of their attitudes toward collective security.  All 
three favor (and Austria has achieved) EU membership; all three participated in the anti-
nuclear Proliferation Security Initiative.9  Each of them has a constitutional structure that 
is legally compatible with participation in collective security regimes at all three levels 
(treaty, convention, voluntary association).  Each of them has an ostensibly transparent 
Ministry of Defense with accessibility to documents and structures that relate to 
collective security organizations.  Each of them has allowed access for foreign 
organizations to conduct public opinion polling relevant to attitudes toward collective 
security.  
This work will attempt to recognize and address limitations on comparability of 
the three countries as well.  A review of national history and post-Cold War reform will 
examine national differences.  The analytical framework will attempt to account, for 
example, for the difference between long-standing traditions of defense structure in 
Imperial Austria, monarchial Croatia and Montenegro’s unique defensive history.  In 
more recent history, the chapter analysis will address the differences that stem from 
Croatia and Montenegro’s history under Yugoslav communism. 
1. Independent and Intervening Variables 
The independent variable considered in this analysis is the national level civil-
military relationship.  To capture this relationship in a fashion that lends itself to 
                                                 
9  United States Department of State, "Proliferation Security Initiative Participants," Office of 
Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c19310.htm (accessed 21 February 2008). 
 9
comparison among nations, this thesis analyzes four intervening variables:  government 
objectives, public attitudes, defense structures and military operations.   
To accurately assess the relationship between declared attitudes on the one hand 
and actual structures/operations on the other, this analysis must account for two kinds of 
intervening variables:  Historic and Subjective.  Historic factors include the cultural traits 
and doctrinal pre-assumptions that dictate a way military and political leaders think about 
security.  Subjective factors are those relating to the human perception of what constitutes 
security.   The two subjective factors this work addresses are: 
• The level of coherence between individual and institutional definitions of 
security; 
• The level of consistency between public attitudes toward different types of 
collective security organizations  (US-based /EU/NATO/UN).  The lack of 
consistency in this area drives the third Subordinate Question listed above. 
2. Dependent Variable 
The Dependent Variable examined in this study is national participation in 
international collective security arrangements as measured by: 
1. Completion of Partnership Action Plan required structural reforms  
(NATO) 
2. Cooperation with EUROPOL anti-smuggling efforts (EU) 
3. Nature and extent of participation in the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI) 
4. Participation in multi-national Peace Support Operations 
E. RESULTS 
The major question this thesis addresses is:  What factors most inhibit NATO 
Partner nations from fully participating in collective security regimes?  Its objectives are 
to identify the specific factors in each of the three Southeast European nations, assess 
commonalities between the three, and provide illustrations of areas in which current 
collective security institutions fail to represent the priorities and security 
conceptualization of these states.   Its outcome suggests the process of national 
integration into international collective security regimes is not the unidirectional, 
deterministic march that NATO’s Membership Action Plan process suggests.  It is a set 
of simultaneous dialogues, between the national government and international 
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organization and between government and popular opinions.   In its strategy toward PfP 
nations, NATO may be better served to promote a multi-channel method of engagement 
than to blindly promote those nations’ membership in the Alliance.  A policy of 
substantial multi-channel engagement, even with collective security organizations that 
compete with NATO for resources—may better achieve cooperative security objectives. 
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II. REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA 
A hundred kilometers upstream from Vienna, where the Danube begins its 
convoluted course through the Wachau, sits a prime site to study the origins of collective 
security in Austria: the Melk Abbey.  Melk sits above the river where it narrows and, 
paying homage to Bernoulli, speeds up.  Despite its high religious status, Melk was 
originally settled because of its ability to command the rapids.  According to a tour guide, 
a heavy chain lay across the bottom of the river, waiting to tear the keel out of 
uncooperative commercial boats.  A trumpet blast greeted their arrival, conveying a blunt 
message: Pay the toll or we’ll raise the chain. 
Before the Austro Hungarian Empire there was Holy Roman Empire, before that a 
feudal alliance; a Slavic settlement; a Roman outpost.  Melk played host to them all.  
Now a museum, every period it commemorates had a formative impact on the current 
Austrian conception of collective security.  Though the Republik Österreich is a 
thoroughly modern state, understanding the Austrian nation’s approach to collective 
security begins and ends with history.  Austria’s neutrality concept, first dictated under 
occupation in 1955 but ultimately infused with the original views of the nation’s leaders, 
stems from an attempt to avoid repeating history’s mistakes.  The Second Republic has 
spent much of its five decades searching for ways to expand its role in international 
security cooperation while abiding that retrospective concept of neutrality.  During the 
Cold War, the result was a unique hybrid, a militarily pacifistic yet socially activist state.   
A. HISTORY 
1. Introduction 
In the early years of Austria’s Second Republic, British historian Edward 
Crankshaw wrote of Austria’s legacy: "A restoration of the Habsburgs is unthinkable; but 
a restoration of Europe as a complex of interdependent peoples is something to be striven 
 12
for by all decent means."10  The romanticized ideal Crankshaw referred to was a unique 
collective security and collective defense hybrid that evolved into the Habsburg Empire.  
In several respects, the modern European security environment mirrors the traits that 
made the Habsburg Empire viable over a century.   Austria’s concept of collective 
security derives from a period of occupations that began with Rome and continued in 
phases until 1955.  That Austria was occupied was not unique.  The specific way that 
Austria evolved based on the occupations, however, has been.   The empire’s “complex 
of interdependent peoples” represents a novel situation in European history:  a state of 
many states and nationalities. 
The simultaneous outlook on collective defense and collective security 
institutions among Austrians today matches the ascendant Franz Josef's dilemma in mid-
19th Century.  His challenge then was to maintain the Empire despite the external threats 
from Russia and Serbia and the internal threat of economic growth among the Empire’s 
junior partners.  Those twin threats required a balance of collective defense and collective 
security mindsets.  Formal alliances had to provide a sound military defense against 
external threats, while not provoking conflict by appearing too united or too activist.  
Internally, those same alliances had to address the sources of conflict and competition 
within the Empire, and to forestall the growth of those sources through economic, 
structural integration. 
Under the Habsburg Empire, widespread consensus on the need to balance those 
two factors, the internal and the external, led to the "constitutionalist" movement that 
followed on the 1848 Congress of Vienna.  That transnational framework for Central 
Europe, which a century and a half of nationalist movements shredded, is only now re-
emerging today.  Edward Crankshaw cites Baron Eichhoff, a senior Austrian defense 
official as summarizing the spirit of the constitutionalists' international consensus: 
"mutual dependence in the economic sphere -- independence in the political sphere...a 
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glorified customs union of quasi-autonomous peoples."  Eichoff's concept might have 
been exerpted as easily from the European Union's yet unratified constitution as from its 
original imperial context.11 
2. Transnational Basis of Empire 
The Empire's enduring precedent for Austrian engagement with collective 
security was a mechanical interplay between social classes and the structure of alliance.  
Austria was not unique among countries with an imperial past and a significant industrial 
growth during the 19th century, but it was the most extreme case of industrial growth 
combined with an imperial capital.  This growth yielded a linkage between political 
parties and the alliance options available to the Habsburgs.  As Barbara Jelavich explains, 
the industrial revolution in Austria coincided with the dissemination of revolutionary 
movements throughout Germany, and Eastern Europe.  The growth of Austria's merchant 
class meant that the emperor had to tolerate a significant level of autonomy among 
industrial regions.  In fact, economic network-building became a central tool of security 
policy.12  Austria’s imperial model fundamentally shifted, and with it the imperial 
concepts of what constituted security and how to achieve it.  Prior to 1848, Austria’s 
empire was a culturally inclusive amalgamation of regions, which relied on expansion 
and consolidation of power through arranged marriages.13  Industrial growth and the 
pressure to compete with the Great Powers resulted in a new, transnational basis of 
empire.  Describing that novel imperial model, Crankshaw writes:   
As a concept, Austrian patriotism did not exist...at the height of 
centralized Imperial might Vienna had become the capital of a great 
Empire and the dynasty ruled over a dozen races...where patriotism 
existed as a force it was either local or racial (and) usually at odds with the 
pretensions of the dynasty.14 
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The separation of linguistic from ethnic and ethnic from national identity meant 
that the Empire had a unique approach to questions of collective security.  The empire 
itself was both a collective defense mechanism versus the other Great Powers and a 
collective security regime that channeled internal disputes into palace intrigue and 
commercial competition.  In the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the processes of creating a 
common defense were subordinated to that dynastic concept.  Despite National 
Socialism’s attempt to make ethnicity synonymous with the nation, that dynastic 
separation has endured into the present. 
3. First Republic (1918-1933) 
The Treaty of Saint-Germain codified Austria's boundaries in a Deutsch-
Österreich identity.  The Austrian law, as historians Ritchie Robertson and Edward 
Timms explain, based citizenship solely on current domicile ("zustaendigkeit") and and 
geographic origin ("Heimat"), a situation that between the World Wars left Adolf Hitler a 
"stateless person."   Though annulment of this citizenship law was one of  the Nazis' first 
acts following the 1939 Anschluss, the Second World War constituted only a temporary 
suspension of a century-long multi-ethnic concept of Austrian citizenship.15  
After 1919, national boundaries no longer coincided with ethnic populations.  The 
architects of post-World War I Central Europe intentionally attempted to de-couple 
ethnic identity from state security.  The concept of a Pan-Slavist state that would elide 
Croatian, Serbian and Slovenian cultures into a single Kingdom was a prime example of 
that mindset.  World War II, though caused by the failure of that transnational 
experiment, ultimately reinforced the separation of state from ethnic identity.  In Austria, 
that distinction was constitutionally enshrined in the First Republic’s constitution.  So 
successful was the Treaty of St. Germain in enforcing state boundaries across ethic lines, 
Timms contends the Entente’s power in the 1920’s exceeded the United Nations’ ability 
in the early 1990s to enforce such boundaries.16  Among the three states under 
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comparison, therefore, Austria has the longest and most legally precedented multi-ethnic 
concept of citizenship and national identity.  This tradition has led to an activist attitude 
among Austrians toward collective security institutions.  Not only are Austrians 
comfortable with the concept of a supranational organization arbitrating disputes that 
span cultural and legal boundaries, a strong consensus favors an activist role of collective 
security organizations to address such discontinuities.  For Austria, collective security is 
not a passive, reactive function.  It is an essential component to the definition and 
maintenance of national identity. 
4. Foundation of Second Republic (1945-1955) 
The Austrian Republic's rushed creation at the end of World War II had lasting 
implications for the nation's relationship with collective security regimes.  Even beyond 
the occupation’s end in 1955, public attitudes toward NATO, the EU and bilateral 
defense cooperation remained a national form of 'frozen conflicts' that would not be 
articulated in domestic politics until the Soviet Union's demise in 1991. 
Between the Axis' defeat and the 1955 withdrawal of occupying forces, Austria 
contended with a set of competing factions.  Where the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
consolidated several geographically distinct cultures under a divinely blessed cult of 
personality, Austria after the war had the worst of both worlds:  rival ethnic factions, 
geographically intermixed, but without a central governing authority.  James Carafano 
described the situation as follows: 
After the Anschluss, Germany had amalgamated Austrian troops into its 
own military forces so at the end of the conflict the country had no 
independent military service.  In the immediate postwar period, a number 
of paramilitary organizations sponsored by French, British, Yugoslav, 
Slovene and Austrian communists claimed some kind of lineage and 
legitimacy.17 
While the military threat those groups posed was small compared to the 
occupying forces, the experience of negotiating with terrorists, or at least factoring their 
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demands into the political process, became central to the Austrian relationship with 
collective security regimes during the Cold War.    
In stark contrast to the paramilitary organizations, which pursued the politics of 
extortion until the Republic was strong enough to ignore them and the occupation forces 
succeeded in disrupting them, the Catholic Church played a consistent role in redefining 
Austria’s concept of security.  Anton Pelinka asserts that in the formative years of 
occupation and the Second Republic’s foundation, the Church played a simultaneously 
stabilizing and progressive role.  While publicly associated with nostalgia for the old 
order, Austria’s Catholic leadership was instrumental in framing the public debate over 
national identity between the Social Democratic and Christian Democratic parties.18 
5. Under Occupation 
Under four-power occupation, a cumbersome constitutional structure  replaced the 
Soviet role in Vienna, thereby preventing the development or expression of any national 
or regional consensus on collective security.  Austria's political leadership paid close 
attention to the attitudes, structures and working relationships of the surrounding nations 
in defining its role.  Like the eagle of imperial Austria Hungary, the Second Republic's 
national security apparatus had two heads, one looking to the East, the other to the West. 
Even before the Federal Republic of Germany formalized its security and defense 
structures for integration into NATO, Westward-leaning Austrian leaders sought to 
configure the nation institutionally for a shadow membership in the Alliance.  
Communist-influenced leaders meanwhile focused their efforts on keeping defense 
resources within limits acceptable to Austria's Eastern neighbors, and ensuring that the 
nation's political structure retained its commitment to neutral diplomacy.  The nation's 
parliamentary structure, designed as a compromise between a strongly socialist urban 
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population and an equally entrenched alpine Christian Democratic movement, guaranteed 
that debates over any national leanings East or West of passive neutrality would remain 
consigned to social venues.19 
6. Post Occupation 
As the cold war progressed, the hysterical divides of opinion among political 
leaders regarding the nation's proper role in international security resulted in an odd role 
for the Austrian Republic in the international system.  Though external military threats 
and internal political divides ruled out an activist foreign policy, Vienna played host to 
many of the organizations where important security decisions were transacted.  These 
included the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC).  In its role of diplomatic host, the Austrian Republic 
thereby came to play a central role in how concepts of collective security evolved on both 
sides of Churchill's "Iron Curtain." 
7. US Post-Conflict Stabilization and Reconstruction 
James Jay Carafano’s description of postwar reconstruction in Austria, published 
in 2002, bears some striking parallels to the more recent US experience in Iraq.  
According to Carafano, at the close of World War II, US forces in Austria suffered from 
a lack of doctrine and experience in reconstruction and peacekeeping.  The Austrian 
experience under occupation and in the reconstitution of its armed forces bore the marks 
of influence from this American inexperience.20 
Austria enshrined in its defense institutions an explicit policy of agile neutrality, 
which contrasted to the strong neutrality of its Western neighbor Switzerland.  Instead of 
premising its defense policy on a strong border defense, Austria assumed in a major 
conflict it would either be overrun or that NATO would intervene on the nation’s behalf.  
This fact led to its external policy of declared neutrality.  The internal counterpart to that 
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defense concept was a belief that insurgent groups posed a great enough threat to require 
co-opting.  Thus instead of abandoning Vienna to stronger invaders and retreating to the 
mountains (as, repeatedly the monarchy had done in the Imperial era), the Austrian 
Republic's founding defense concept was to engage only diplomatically beyond its 
borders and to arm defensively only against weaker invaders.  A policy of active 
engagement and shifting alliances in both East and West would match Austria's attempt 
to defensively fortify its center.21 
8. Post Cold War 
As Communism in Eastern Europe and the Balkans collapsed, Austria became a 
pivot point for reform of national models of security and defense.  The first intellectual 
movements to propagate widely throughout the Austrian Republic's foreign policy 
infrastructure were the pan-European attempts of neo-liberal theorists to define a new 
agenda even while the old system was still alive.  Among these was the effort to "rethink 
European security" sponsored by the West European Forum on the Problems of Peace 
and War.22 
a. Early Activism and Promotion of EU as Alternative to NATO 
The first structural change of the Austrian armed forces based on 
participation in collective security regimes was the nation's 1992 initiation of its "Stand-
by Arrangement System" with the United Nations.  Though the Austrian Peoples’ Party 
(ÖVP) and Social Democratic (SPÖ) differed significantly in their strategies, a strong 
consensus existed that Austria should take a leadership role in amassing coalitions for 
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Peacekeeping operations.  In 1996, Austria created the CENCOOP, an organization of 
Central European states inclined toward providing regional support packages for United 
Nations Peacekeeping operations.23   
The most significant shift in Austria’s policy toward collective security 
regimes occurred after September 11th, 2001.  The details of this shift are provided 
hereafter in the Structures section. 
B. GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES 
According to Commander of Land Forces LTG Edmund Entacher, contemporary 
Austria has five primary defense missions:   
1. Contending with the consequences of terrorism 
2. Combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
3. Preventing and responding to regional conflicts 
4. Preventing state failures 
5. Contending with the consequences of organised crime 
6. Responding to Natural disasters24 
The strategy that derives from those threats constitutes Austria’s cold war 
neutrality turned on its head.  Instead of expecting an overwhelming force and attempting 
to avoid conflict through diplomacy, it is premised on the expectation that conflict is 
inevitable and the primary security challenge is to prepare for its effects.  This strategy 
reflects in the formal ties Austria has forged with each type of collective security regime:  
collective defense organizations (NATO and EU), treaties, conventions and voluntary 
cooperation programs. 
1. NATO Intentions  
Austria's post cold war revised attitude towards NATO was first formalized in 
1995. Then Foreign Minister Alois Mock in the NATO Journal affirmed both Austria's 
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commitment to undersigning the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy 
as part of its EU membership, and the compatibility of that CFSP membership with an 
active role in the Partnership for Peace.   This was the first time in the history of the 
Second Republic that an Austrian official publicly declared participation in regional 
collective defense regimes to be compatible with the nation's constitutional commitment 
to neutrality.25 
Austria was one of the first nations to join NATO's Partnership for Peace.  Since 
1995, it has given PfP a prominent position in its foreign policy.  To reinforce its 
dedication to PfP and provide a legislative liaison between NATO Headquarters and the 
Austrian parliament, both Foreign and Defense Ministries created permanent 
organizations dedicated to PfP.26 
In addition to its formal affiliation with NATO through the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council, since 2000 Austria has maintained a "bilateral tailored cooperation 
programme" with NATO Headquarters.  In practice this relationship has served as a 
channel to re-negotiate the EAPC objectives and to lobby NATO for inclusion of former 
Yugoslav states in the Partnership for Peace.27 
According to the United Nations, September 11th resulted in sweeping changes in 
Austria’s defense doctrine.  The nation's most immediate public response was the 
December, 2001 passage of a new "comprehensive security concept" which constituted a 
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toward "non-military threats" and most importantly, amendment of the nation's half-
century policy of "permanent neutrality" in favor of a new model, the "alliance free 
state."28 
2. EU Intentions 
As Oxford Analytica in 2008 concluded, finding appropriate niche leadership 
roles for Europe's small but modern defense forces is a significant part of the overall 
attempt to resuscitate the EU's constitutional movement.  The Austrian government, 
accordingly, has made defense reform for international operations one of its public 
examples of national leadership in the EU.29 
The Prague Institute of International Relations' Michal Koran has reviewed the 
evolution of Austria's concept of neutrality among the nation's political leaders since the 
end of the Warsaw Pact.  According to Koran, despite overwhelming public support for 
the European Union's Common Security and Foreign Policy (CSFP) and general 
acceptance of a cooperative working relationship with NATO, Austria's "holy mantle of 
neutrality"remains political kryptonite for any leader who might choose to re-negotiate 
it.30    
3. Toward the United Nations 
Austria's history with the United Nations has been a constant quest to enjoy a 
stronger leadership role and to make a regional security contribution out of proportion to 
the resources it is able to devote to the cause.  As in its relationship to NATO, the ratio of 
Austria's prominence to its financial and military contribution has led the nation's 
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detractors to accuse it of enjoying a "free rider" status in the collective security system.31  
To less dismissive observers, however, the Republic's methods and objectives are a 
model for effective niche contribution to an international order. 
4. Toward Private Actors 
Private actors, including individuals, churches and Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) play a large and sanctioned role in Austria's engagement with 
collective security organizations.  Beyond coexistence, the Austrian government 
frequently incorporates NGOs into both the formulation and execution of foreign policy 
for international security cooperation.  In some cases, NGOs act internationally and 
independently.  For example, the government has directly reimbursed the Church-based 
Caritas for its role in coordinating de-mining activities.32 
C. PUBLIC ATTITUDES 
1. Toward NATO 
In the mid- to late 1990s, Austrian public attitudes toward collective defense and 
collective security organizations were generally ambivalent and confused.  A 1997 
United States Information Agency survey, for example, found that Austrians had the 
lowest level of confidence in NATO among 19 Western and Central European nations 
(plus Canada).  Only 30% of those polled expressed a "fair amount" or "great deal" of 
confidence in the organization.   National attitudes toward the United Nations, and the 
Western European Union (WEU), while more favorable, were still below the group 
average.  Even the OSCE, enjoying a home court advantage, did not poll better than 50% 
favorable response.33  The chief reason for the lack of Austrian confidence in collective 
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security regimes was the firsthand experience Austrian citizens had with NATO, the EU 
and UN’s failure to intervene in the Yugoslav Wars of Dissolution. 
2. Toward EU 
A significant literature on Austrian public attitudes toward the EU exists, 
including some studies that detail the attitudes of specific political parties over time, and 
how inter-party negotiation has been tied to EU membership.  Few studies have 
addressed the topic at the party level of detail, focusing solely on security however.  
Analysis of Austrian attitudes toward the EU as a collective defense mechanism must 
therefore be tempered by the knowledge that in Austria, as in former communist states, 
the EU is primarily associated with economic matters and material gain, whereas NATO 
is associated almost entirely with security.   
Austria was unique among the three nations studied in that throughout the 1990s, 
citizens identified the EU simultaneously with military stability and economic 
advantage34  Erik Tillman's study of Austria in 2000 concluded that the Republic's voting 
behavior and public attitudes repudiated the earlier conclusion of a "democratic deficit" 
between government attitudes and citizen opinions.  Citizens, to the contrary, played a 
definitive role.  Furthermore, Tillman concluded that in Austria, public attitudes toward 
the EU corresponded to elements of EU policy, not views on the Union itself as a 
disembodied entity.  Tillman's work reaffirmed Matthew Gabel's earlier conclusion that 
Austrians’ individual attitudes toward the EU did not strongly correlate to left-right 
political status or party affiliation.35  That weak correlation is particularly ironic for 
Austria because the nation's three main political parties, the social democratic SPO, 
christian conservative OVP and nationalist FPO all slavishly tied their voting records and 
campaigns to the nation's relationship with the European Union.  In the most extreme 
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example, talks regarding formation of a Grand Coalition between the SPO and OVP in 
2003 fell apart over a dispute regarding Austria's acquisition of the Eurofighter.36 
D. STRUCTURES 
Austria's role in regional security, includes active participation in all regional 
cooperation regimes, including those of NATO.  At the voluntary, multilateral level, so 
many regional and sub-regional structures have proliferated, the Balkans represent the 
upper extreme of overlapping responsibilities. 
The desire to engage more extensively and effectively with collective security 
operations were central in Austria's 2004 defense reform, which according to the EIU 
Viewswire, will result in the closure of "Around 40% of the barracks...with a general shift 
in emphasis away from traditional defense to a more flexible and mobile force with rapid 
reaction capability."37 
1. Collective Defense Level 
Austria's role as champion of an EU-based collective defense regime in 
competition with NATO was sealed in its 1998 role of rotational EU president.  At that 
time, widespread consensus in Western Europe favored the formalization of an exclusive 
EU force.  That consensus created a prisoner's dilemma of incentives among traditional 
EU holdouts to the idea.  Whichever state first abandoned its resistance to the EUROFOR 
concept in exchange would reap a leadership role in designing the new force.  As Michael 
Quinlan explains, the "thinking aloud character of the [1998 Austrian] Portschach 
exchanges" provoked British Prime Minister Tony Blair to throw his weight behind the 
European Force, lest Britain be widely perceived as passive.38 
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In the nation's first address to the UN General Assembly following the 2001 
attacks, Austria's Permanent Representative pledged to abide by the European Council's 
"comprehensive Action Plan" for international cooperation to combat terrorist 
networks.39   In the succeeding 7 years, Austria has overwhelmingly abided by that 
pledge.  September 2005 saw ratification of the EU Convention on Suppression of Acts 
of Terror, police procedure standardization, civil defense, threat assessment and crisis 
coordination.  Austria also ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of 
Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,40 European Arrest Warrant, Joint Investigation Teams, 
Amendments to EUROPOL convention, as well as acquis communitaire Old conventions 
on hijacking, aviation security, nuclear material, maritime security41 
As of the first EUFOR Capabilities Declaration in 2000, Austria pledged to 
earmark 2000 troops (4% of its total combat force) for EU Joint Operations.  In 2005, 
when the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) was formalized in the "battlegroup" 
concept, Austria reaffirmed that pledge with a commitment to supporting a standing unit 
with Germany and the Czech Republic.42 
2. NATO 
The growth of Austrian commitment to an independent EU deployable force 
between 1998 and 2005 belies a fundamental shift in national security strategy that 
occurred after 9/11.  In all four areas of the Austria's defense policy, the terrorist attacks 
of 2001 brought about a dramatic shift from a competitive to a cooperative relationship 
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with NATO.  The 2004 Madrid Train bombings, which highlighted European 'crossroads 
cities' vulnerability to attack, affirmed the national change in priorities.  The chief 
mechanism for mediating the EU / NATO resource conflicts has been the EAPC Action 
Plan, which provided wide-ranging support for NATO contingency operations in areas 
previously requiring round-robin approval.43 
The primary structures that formally link Austrian defense organization to NATO 
are the Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.  Among EAPC 
members, Austria stands out.  Where traditionally the organization was dedicated to 
addressing resource shortages, i.e. areas where EU and NATO commitments might speak 
for the same forces, Austria has actively employed EAPC as a means to promote an 
independent conception of EU foreign policy. 
3. Convention Level 
Austria is a signatory to all Weapons of Mass Destruction Treaties, including the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty, Biological Weapons Convention, Chemical Weapons 
Convention, and the Missile Technology Control Regime.44 
4. Voluntary / Bilateral 
The Stability Pact, which bills itself as "the first serious attempt by the 
international community to replace the previous, reactive crisis intervention policy in 
South Eastern Europe with a comprehensive, long-term conflict prevention strategy" is a 
regional, multilateral, voluntary framework sponsored by the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe on behalf of the EU.45 
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Austria has pursued an activist role within the United Nations throughout the 
Second Republic's history of membership.  Despite, and in conscious compensation for 
the nation's "Verdross Doctrine," which formalized Austria's right to opt-out of any 
United Nations operation that violated its constitutional doctrine of neutrality, Austria has 
continually played an active--though numerically limited--role in UN Peacekeeping 
Operations.46 
Some of the Austrian contributions to the United Nations are products of 
Verdross, in that they involve significant logistical support without committing personnel 
or resources beyond the nation's borders.  Examples include Austria's considerable 
financial support for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) headquarters in 
Vienna and the nation's sponsorship of track-two and formal diplomatic negotiations such 
as the "Agreement on Succession Issues of the former Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia."47 
As Michal Koran explains, Karl Zemanek's politically successful re-interpretation 
of the Verdross Doctrine in 1961 allowed Austria to engage more widely with the United 
Nations, contributing armed troops to operations conducted "for peaceful purposes."  In 
practice, this translated to a legislative carte blanche to participate in UN Chapter Six 
(Peacekeeping) operations wherever resources could be found and risk--be it physical to 
the soldiers or political to the superpowers--was moderate. That mandate would continue 
until 1983's coalition government recast the policy as a regional one.48 
5. Non-Proliferation Structures 
Consistent with its thematic support for non-proliferation efforts through the 
IAEA, Austria is an active and contributing member of all UNSCR 1540 non- and 
counter-proliferation organizations.  These include the Waasenaar Arrangement, Nuclear 
Suppliers' Group, Zangger Committee, Missile Technology Control Regime and 
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Australia Group.  Beyond formal affiliation with those organizations, Austria is an active 
member of the Proliferation Security Initiative and has hosted at state expense numerous 
relevant academic conferences. 
In addition to its key role in global non-proliferation efforts for strategic weapons, 
Austria is active in a number of initiatives dedicated to controlling conventional weapons 
proliferation and destroying legacy weapons systems in former communist states.  The 
greatest expenditure from the Austrian defense budget has been for measures related to 
mine clearance and destruction in Former Yugoslavia.49 
In the 1990s, Austria's legal cooperation for collective security focused on the 
coordination of voluntary international working agreements through Vienna's UN Center 
for International Crime Prevention.  As with questions regarding more traditional military 
roles and structures, however, the terror attacks in 2001 shook consensus out of decades-
long intractable political debates over information sharing and law enforcement.  The 
tragic 2004 Madrid and 2005 London bombings reinforced this consensus, and ensured 
that the declarations in the immediate wake of 9/11 translated into law.50 
While the Second Republic has pursued a constant strategy of engagement with as 
many collective security organizations as its constitution would at each phase allow, the 
greatest indication of its future may lie not in the public, but in the private realm.  As will 
be explained in the succeeding chapters, Austrian businesses themselves may constitute 
the greatest tool for influencing regional collective security, and traditionally they had the 
power to dictate the terms of engagement.   It is therefore ironic that Austria, having 
achieved military independence and security against a threat from the East, is now more 
than ever subject to commercial decisions made in Moscow.  Traditionally, business in 
Austria has been an arm of foreign policy.  Now that Gazprom has a controlling stake in 
the Baumgarten natural gas terminal, the relationship may be reversed.51 
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E. OPERATIONS 
Austria’s military operations today are unparalleled in Europe in their level of 
transparency and orientation toward Peace Support and Peacekeeping Operations 
(PSO/PKO).  Most of the organizational structures, command relationships and legal 
documentation that underpin them are directly available on the Bundesheer website.52  
The inauguration of Austria’s Joint Forces Command Graz (AUTJFC) in September, 
2006 represented a major step toward interoperability with all the collective security 
regimes the nation participates in.53  While such JFCs are the norm throughout NATO 
and the European Union, Austrian forces from 1955 until the defense reform legislation 
in 2001 still had an operational framework that reflected its origins under military 
occupation. Beyond its doctrinal weaknesses, the old command and control system was 
tied to regional government and parliamentary party orientation.  It effectively required 
legislators to perform the role normally played by a ministry of defense.  Each time a 
potential PSO opportunity surfaced, legislators had to work out its permissions, logistics 
and command structure.   
1. NATO  
Austria’s formal participation in NATO operations dates to 1996, when the nation 
deployed a brigade in support of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.54  Other Article VIII (Out of Area) operations have included continuous 
support for the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) since 200255 and a 
rotation as commander of the Kosovo MNTF-S Command starting in May, 2008.56  With 
the establishment of Austrian “Forces for International Operations” (FIOP) program 
                                                 
52 “OPCON of Austrian Armed Forces in International Operations"," BMLV Republic of Austria, 
http://www.bmlv.gv.at/truppendienst/international/artikel.php?id=27 (accessed 03 April 2008). 
53 Entacher, The Army's Evolution, 24. 
54 "OPCON of Austrian Armed Forces in International Operations" 
55 "NATO’s Relations with Austria:  How does Cooperation Work in Practice?" North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-austria/practice.html (accessed 03 April 2008). 
56 European Military Press Association, "Austrian 4th Mechanized Brigade in Albania " EMPA 
Newsletter 9, no. 778 (2007), 2, http://www.empa.hu/files/9/778/newsletter_2_2007.pdf (accessed 30 April 
2008). 
 30
under the Austrian Joint Forces Command, the process of approving further participation 
in any NATO out-of-area mission will involve a simple yea or nay decision by the 
Council of Ministers and the Parliament.57  Ironically, it will be more legally 
straightforward for Austrian forces to serve in support of NATO’s international 
peacekeeping operations than in support of any Article V (collective defense) mission. 
2. European Union 
The European Union enjoys a straightforward operating relationship with Austria, 
consistent with long term Austrian participation in the ESDP.  Technically, the 300 
troops provided for SFOR operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina constituted an EU force, 
though the entire structure was created in coordination with NATO.   As will be 
discussed later, this mixing of alliance roles has led to a conceptual uncertainty and 
significant public response in the Balkans.  Austria has supported the EU MNTF-N force 
since 2005, and in the counterpart to Bosnia is relieving NATO in the South this month.58  
The largest Austrian commitment of combat troops for EU operations thus far has been 
the nation’s leadership role in developing a response force for Chad.  Deployed in 
response to the humanitarian crisis which has spilled over from neighboring Darfur, 
Sudan, the Austrian commitment there constitutes a return to leadership as a lobbyist for 
expanded EU out-of-area operations. 
3. United Nations 
Austrian operational support for United Nations PKO/PSO dates to 1960’s 
Congo.59  The high level of general approval hamstrung by inter-party conflict, however, 
meant that Austrian deployments had to be kept to observer missions or very small 
details.  Only occasionally would parliamentary leaders agree on larger deployments.   
In 1997, Austria volunteered troops for Operation Alba, an Italian-sponsored ad 
hoc coalition to address the humanitarian crisis in Albania.  John Deni identifies Alba as 
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a major "missed opportunity" for NATO, which laid bare the Alliance's weaknesses of 
resources, political will, doctrine and organizational inertia.  Austria's experience in Alba 
(including the irony that the nation, as a NATO holdout, wound up compensating for a 
lack of NATO consensus) was instrumental in the nation's decision to formally re-define 
its PKO policy from 1997-2002.60 
4. Sum of Operational Participation 
Austria's attitude toward collective security operations has undergone a marked 
transition over the last decade.  From a reactive mindset, that provided troops on a 
contingency basis where available and focused primarily on maintaining the nation's 
international image, Austria has transitioned to a well-defined activist policy that seeks to 
create and maintain standing forces and define their role within standing coalitions in 
advance of deployments.  In contrast to the nation's rhetoric and policy in the 1990s, 
Austria's operations in the last decade have demonstrated a shift away from promoting 
the EU as a collective defense competitor to NATO and toward a focus on maximum 
contribution to regional stability. 
F. NATIONAL CONCLUSION 
Despite the sophistication of its civil military relations, limited and earmarked 
defense resources prevent Austria from taking a strong leadership role in regional 
collective security regimes.  Austria today is a nation whose public attitudes toward 
collective security reflect a mature and highly participative approach to democratic 
control of the armed forces.   Utterly gone are the aspirations to Great Power and 
territorial hegemony, as are the attitudes of cultural superiority that originally drove them.  
Yet some traits of the nation's imperial past still remain.  The willingness of political 
leaders to promote alliance building, even where it meets with lackluster public approval, 
remains central.  The acceptance of simultaneous cooperation with regimes that compete 
for the same scarce resources is also consistent.  Further, just as the empire tolerated the 
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independent diplomacy of subordinate states, Austrian law and political practice allows 
for the active role of sub-national actors in regional collective security cooperation.  The 
conservative OVP, for, example, has independently played an active role in the Stability 
Pact for South-Eastern Europe (the "Stability Pact") by sponsoring academic and 
diplomatic conferences promoting international approaches to common security 
challenges. In this role, the OVP Diplomatic Academy has blurred the distinction 
between scholarship and politics.  Other areas where multiple channels for negotiation 
with collective security regimes are proliferating include multi-national corporations, 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and political parties.  The "Stability Pact" 
demonstrates not only can all those organizations co-exist within a single voluntary 
collective security regime, they can convert the regime into a tool for building consensus 
behind their preferred legal or treaty based frameworks.  If the number and type of 
national organizations that engage with voluntary-consensual collective security regimes 
are an indicator of national will, Austria is Europe's most active proponent of collective 
security.61 
In both deliberate foreign policy and in public acceptance of collective security 
institutions, the mindset of Austria's imperial past still echoes. Austria’s concepts of 
alliance and threat, though infused with democratic influences, still mirror those of the 
imperial epoch.  Alliances are geographically and socially compartmentalized; interest 
coalitions form and dissolve independently while remaining subordinate to the overall 
structure.  For Austrians today, defensive coalitions still bear a strong resemblance to the 
arranged marriages of their imperial past:  realistic only in the pairing of compatible 
partners, desirable only if they yield a stronger supranational identity than the status quo.   
Austria's is a foreign policy that still favors preemptive action to address 
impending challenges.  While the long tradition of preemption was based on great power 
gaming, now the nation's foreign policy establishment operates based on a clearly 
articulated consensus of the nation's strategic priorities and vulnerabilities.   According to 
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Andrew Cottey, Austria and Germany "have common interests in Central Europe and 
have taken a leading role in promoting EU/NATO engagement in that region."62 While a 
similar general observation is appropriate for the Balkans, some fundamental differences 
exist in both national interests and the degree to which nations pursue those interests 
through collective security regimes. 
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III. REPUBLIC OF CROATIA 
A. HISTORY 
1. Introduction 
Among European states, Croatia is one of the strongest current examples where 
ethnic and religious identity coincide with sovereign borders.  This fact is not an accident, 
nor was it always the case.  Croatia’s status as one of the most ethnically homogenous 
states of Europe owes partially to its strong ethno-religious identity, but also largely to 
the experience of dealing with stronger invaders.  Its current homogeneity also owes to 
two brutal 20th century episodes of ethnic cleansing.   
Croatian mythology depicts the country as the independent Southeastern bulwark 
of Catholicism, but while that history is filled with military triumphs, it tells an 
incomplete story of the the nation’s experience with collective defense and collective 
security regimes. From a Slavic outpost to a Roman province, from partition under the 
Venetian Empire to Habsburg seaport, from fascist collaborator to laboratory of socialist 
federalism, Croatia has extensive experience as a client state to larger regional powers.  If 
the current Croatian public is suspicious of transnational security schemes, however, that 
historical experience includes plenty of examples to justify such wariness.  Though 
Croatia has a millennium of experience integrating itself into transnational collective 
defense regimes, most of those initiatives have resulted in a subsequent forfeit of national 
sovereignty. 
2. Austro-Hungarian Empire 
As discussed in the Austrian case study, the Habsburg Empire functioned both as 
collective defense and collective security mechanism.  Vienna carefully managed 
national rivalries in support of a supranational state concept.  Within that system, Croatia 
played a relatively consistent role.  In a process Kathleen Pond describes in Endgame in 
the Balkans, Croatian nobles first pledged themselves to Hungarian rule for both 
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collective defense and collective security reasons.   Hungarian rule provided the 
organizing structure and strategic depth necessary to coordinate Croatian defense against 
the Ottoman Turks.  It also served as a primitive collective security system by preventing 
a crisis of succession after the death of King Zvonomir. As the Croatian knights ejected 
the Turks and consolidated their control over inland territories, however, it became clear 
that the Hungarian nobility would continue its occupation and retain its control over 
Croat lands.63  Croatian nobles had forfeited national autonomy in favor of collective 
defense.  
When the Hungarian rulers joined the revolutions of 1848, Croatia’s nobility 
echoed with a pan-slavist revolt of their own.  Though the movement did not resonate 
across the Danube in the Kingdom of Serbia, it provided the ideological concept on 
which the post-World War I pan-slavist alliance would be based.64  Of equal importance, 
the military conflict that followed the 1848 revolt delivered Istria and the Dalmatian coast 
into the hands of an enlarged and emboldened Habsburg Empire.  
3. Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1918-1929) 
In the aftermath of the World War that had begun in Sarajevo, Croatia became a 
part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.  What began as a pan-Slavist 
experiment after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire quickly revealed how the 
Habsburg structure had kept ethnic and religious conflict in check.  In what Sabrina 
Ramet labels the “bi-polar” system, Yugoslavia quickly re-aggregated into a pair of 
warring camps.  Where previously, collective defense under a transnational structure had 
been the order of the day, the newly “unified” Kingdom was born at war with itself.65 
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4. Ustaše Period 
Croatia’s collaboration with the Axis during World War II bears little 
resemblance to the nation’s current concept of collective security.  Two characteristics of 
this dark period in the nation’s history do, however, influence the nation’s current 
concept of approach to alliances.  First, Croatia’s relationship with the Axis during the 
Second World War was consistent both in precedent and in mechanics to its previous 
alliances with larger regional powers.  Second, self-reliance in national defense was 
associated with expeditionary, offensive action. 
As with Hungarian rule, Croatia in World War II sought alliance with Germany 
on favorable terms by offering the Axis a significant (and largely self-contained) 
expeditionary offensive capability.  Beyond the level that Nazi coercion or defense 
against a Soviet threat might reasonably explain, Croatia took an active role in combat 
operations on the German Eastern Front.  National views on the history, however, are 
consistent with what Bruce MacDonald labels two longstanding Croatian myths, the 
“myth of continuous Croatian statehood,” and the myth of “reactive nature.”66  Excepting 
the two collective security structures forced on Croatia in defeat, the 1918 Yugoslav 
Kingdom and the 1946 Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia, a millennium of 
Croatian history had seen the state growing more cohesive through activist diplomacy 
with superior regional powers.  As MacDonald concludes, however, the prevailing 
opinion among Croatian citizens continues to be that the Ustaše committed atrocities only 
as necessary to preserve the state and in reaction to the Soviet threat.67  
For individuals, Ustaše rule provided an opportunity to shred the aristocratic 
institutions which had formed the basis of national identity and the means to justify 
international alliances under the Yugoslav Kingdom.  Croatia’s public emerged from the 
war stunned, polarized and more ethnically divided than ever.  In what became the 
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Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the government would spend much of its 
resources on freezing and suppressing those ethnic divisions. 
5. Independence to Present 
Alex J. Bellamy and Timothy Edmunds, in their 2005 review of Croatian civil-
military relations, divided the Croatian postwar history of reform into three phases, 
“nation building,” “regime defence,” and “reform.”  The first phase, which lasted from 
the nation’s 1991 independence declaration until 1995, approached international defense 
cooperation only as acts of necessity and expedience in support of a fundamentally 
domestic military effort.  Like its running-mate Slovenia (and later Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Macedonia and Montenegro), Croatia’s primary challenge in this period was not the 
overhaul of inherited defense institutions but the creation of new institutions in the midst 
of a war.  During this period, international cooperation on security was limited to ad hoc 
and sometimes inconsistent working arrangements.68   Bellamy and Edmunds’ second 
phase, from 1995 until the death of the Republic’s patriarch in 2000, saw individual 
leaders and Ministry of Defense (MoD) departments attempt to formalize their existing 
arrangements in a frontier constitution that would legally codify the positions they held: 
Prior to 1998 Ministry of Defense spending was not even audited by the 
State Auditing Office nor did it provide yearly reports to parliament…this 
endemic politicization soured relations between the military and wider 
society in Croatia.69   
Though Croatia officially announced its intention to join the Partnership for Peace 
in 1994 and maintained a high level of diplomatic engagement with the NATO 
Headquarters, the reform of defense institutions that were prerequisite to membership 
was frozen out until Franjo Tuđjman’s death.   
Bellamy and Edwards’ “third phase,” which began in 2000 and continues to the 
present, represented the first attempt to divorce defense policy from executive privilege, 
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the Ministry of Defense from the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), and international 
cooperation from a nationalist vision of the state.70  While the overhaul of defense 
institutions to eliminate the culture of patronage took center stage in the 2000 
parliamentary elections, Croatia’s desire to access International Military Education and 
Training funds played a significant role in the transition.   Tuđjman’s rule permitted none 
of the reforms necessary for substantial integration with NATO or the EU.  Beyond the 
President’s extensive constitutional powers, which he wielded to protect his political 
appointees within the Ministry of Defense (and General Staff), his resistance to reform 
carried down to the lowest levels of the Croatian military.   
 B. GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES 
Throughout Croatia’s violent process of gaining independence and state 
formation, the Republic of Croatia’s official statements indicated an intention to become 
a peer state with West European members of NATO and the EU.   While Non-
Governmental Organizations widely criticized Croatia under the Tudjman dynasty for 
enshrouding its intentions in secrecy, today’s Croatian Defense publications are a model 
of transparency.  Put more precisely, they are transparent, but largely copied from 
Western models.  Though the Ministry of Defense and General Staff do not religiously 
adhere to the published intentions, the written guidance is consistent.  Croatia’s 2002 
defense strategy was modeled on its earlier US counterparts, and was released 
deliberately in parallel with the US post-9/11 update.  The 2002 public strategy was the 
flagship of the short-lived Mesič reform government, and survived even when that 
government became a victim of its own reformist zeal.  
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1. NATO Intentions 
According to the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the government of Croatia 
seeks NATO membership as the centerpiece of a multi-lateral security strategy based on 
“reciprocity.”  The Croatian strategy makes explicit linkage between NATO membership 
and the nation’s economic prospects.71 
2. UN Intentions/Peace Support Operations Policy 
Croatia has a history of governmental support for UN Peace Support Operations 
that predates the founding of the Republic.  Under the SFRY, Croatia sent military 
observers to a number of UN monitoring missions.  The participation of Yugoslav 
National Army (JNA) troops in blue-helmet operations was central to Marshal Tito’s 
promotion of Yugoslavia as a leader for the “non-aligned movment” among lesser 
developed nations.72    While the declaration of independence saw the recall of Croats 
deployed on UN peacekeeping missions, the United Nations’ played a central role in the 
new state.  A UN force monitored the Krajina region through UNCRO in 1994-95, 
culminating in the setup of the UNPROFOR.73  Thereafter, the Republic of Croatia 
became a regular (small scale) contributor of forces to UN monitoring and peacekeeping 
missions.  In 2006, Croatia contributed 46 peacekeepers to UN missions worldwide.74 
Croatia’s greatest support and integration into United Nations has not been 
through Peacekeeping Operations, however.  Rather, it has been in national support for 
regional peacekeeping, stabilization and reconstruction, and confidence-building regimes 
created under the UN flag.  To date, Croatia’s largest contribution has been its  
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sponsorship of a Zagreb logistics hub in support of UN operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(UNPROFOR, subsequently transferred to the International Force IFOR then the EU 
Stabilization Force SFOR).  
3. Toward Private Actors 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have played a literally commanding 
role in the development of Croatia’s defense institutions since the nation won its 
independence.  In other states attitudes toward NGOs have ranged from wary tolerance 
(Montenegro) to symbiotic cooperation (Austria).  In the Republic of Croatia, the 
relationship between government and NGO extends beyond even the Austrian model:  
Croatia has formally integrated foreign NGOs, businesses and private consultants and 
private actors into a broad range of its defense institutions. The irony of that extensive 
collaboration is that Croatia itself has almost no homegrown NGOs of its own.75 
In the second half of the 1990s, thanks largely to negative feedback over the slow 
pace of institutional reform under the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) single-party 
rule, Croatia engaged the U.S.-based Military Professional Resources Institute (MPRI) to 
create or completely revise most of the nation’s key defense documents.  As A.J. Bellamy 
explains, the HDZ’s acceptance of MPRI’s advice was at first grudging, then increasingly 
eager.  Offered as a stop-gap during a period in which the EU arms embargo and NATO 
diplomacy prevented formal military-to-military consulting, MPRI’s guidance broke 
loose impediments to reform in several areas of Croatia’s Defense Ministry and overnight 
created a public image of transparency.76   So pervasive was MPRI’s influence on 
Croatian reform, Ministry of Defense officials sought to demonstrate achievement of the 
consultancy’s reform requirements so that they might find alternative sources of funding 
and shift MPRI out.  As the Naval Postgraduate School’s Professor Donald Abenheim 
(who worked with the Croatian Ministry of Defense in 2000) explains, the Croatian 
Ministry of Defense actively courted the United States to receive International Military 
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Education and Training funds as a means to lessen their dependence on MPRI.77  The 
recent history of Croatian defense structures, therefore, has been the transition from 
complete insularity, to intrusive management, to independent initiative. 
C. PUBLIC ATTITUDES 
Collective security regimes, from formal institutions such as NATO and the EU’s 
European Security and Defense Policy to informal working arrangements (such as 
cooperation with Bosnia-Herzegovina over de-mining activities), figure prominently in 
press coverage and domestic politics.  While defense policy does not currently figure as 
prominently as it did during the reform government of 2000-2003, the nation’s 
engagement with regional and international collective security regimes remains central to 
the national agenda.  
1. Toward NATO 
Croatia’s April 2008 invitation to join NATO does not indicate an increased 
consensus in support of the Alliance.  Croatia’s attitude toward NATO is deeply 
ambivalent.  Croatians generally consider NATO membership as both a military necessity 
(to bolster national defenses against Serbia) and a prerequisite for the more economically 
beneficial membership in the European Union.  Public skepticism about the cost and 
value of NATO membership stems from the Atlantic Alliance’s refusal to intervene on 
Croatia’s behalf in 1992.   As NATO operations have involved increasing financial and 
personnel commitments for out-of-area operations, that skepticism has grown.   Despite a 
clear appreciation of the transnational threats NATO addresses (terrorism and crime), the 
increasing level of hazard for Croatian military personnel deployed in support of NATO 
and the increasing cost of weapons systems optimized for Article 8 operations have made 
it increasingly difficult for collective security organizations to keep public opinion 
favorably engaged. 
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Countervailing against the sticker shock for NATO operations, Croatia’s public 
consensus favors membership in NATO to reinforce the nation’s standing as a Western 
European peer.  As Greenwood’s 2005 study noted “a strong strand in popular opinion 
sentiment in Croatia which deeply deplores the fact that NATO (like the EU) has not 
already allowed the state to rejoin the European mainstream.”78 
Croatia’s progress toward NATO membership, which culminated in the nation’s 
Accession Invitation at the April Bucharest Summit, was not without setbacks and 
complications.  In fact, public consensus on joining the Alliance was strongest in the 
early period of independence when the prospect of accession was farthest from reach.  
Initially, Croatian public opinion equated NATO membership with a security guarantee 
against the remainder of Yugoslavia.  When under the JNA onslaught in 1991 the North 
Atlantic Council demurred, public opinion suffered the first of several shocks of 
disillusionment with NATO.  As with steel, this cold shock tempered public opinion into 
a stronger but less flexible mass.  Thus while national resolve to join the Alliance 
strengthened, individual attitudes toward NATO and Croatia’s proper role in it became 
skeptical.  Such cynicism about the national price of collective defense became one of the 
greatest lasting challenges to further integration. 
Another aspect of public opinion, which applies both to NATO and the EU in 
2008 is the phenomenon Dušan Reljić refers to as “Enlargement Fatigue.”  According to 
Reljić, Croatian public opinion has engaged strongly with collective security 
organizations but the public’s resolve toward participation in collective security 
operations has steadily waned.  This impulse—to join but not contribute—owes to two 
factors.  First, the gap between expectation and reality regarding the benefits of 
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media coverage about NATO and the EU.  The same channels broadcast the same 
message, often directed more to decision-makers in Brussels than to the proximate 
audience.79 
D. STRUCTURES 
Despite how hastily Croatia created its defense institutions and how quickly they 
grew and transformed during the national war for independence, the nation’s defense 
structures display the greatest resistance to reform among the three case studies in this 
work.  The legal basis for Civil Military Relations in Croatia, though dramatically more 
specific than it was during the nation’s first decade, is still far from established.  A 2005 
Centre for European Security Studies report concluded: 
So far as ‘roles and responsibilities’ are concerned, lack of clarity is most 
evident in Croatia, where lines of authority are reportedly confused, even 
chaotic.80 
While defense reform has played a prominent role in Croatian parliamentary 
politics since Operation Storm re-established the nation’s territorial sovereignty, the 
Ministry of Defense still maintains much of the insular status it won during the war.  
(Croatia’s MoD preceded all other government institutions.)  In fact, the level of 
parliamentary inquiry into ministerial decisions has been a key indicator of Croatia’s 
democratic reform status.  The first legislative efforts to challenge the MoD’s authority 
and to define Croatia’s working relationship with NATO and collective security 
institutions did not take place until 2002.81 
Another structural challenge that has strong influence on public attitudes toward 
collective security regimes is Croatia’s unresolved task of repatriating non-Croat refugees 
displaced in the War of Independence. As Bjorn Kuehne notes, the European Union, 
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OSCE and United Nations have simultaneously attempted to address the challenge, with 
little success. Lack of progress toward resolution of this issue preserves longstanding 
tensions with Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro.  From cooperation in NATO 
training, to regional crime-fighting efforts, to support for the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), those tensions are a key impediment to Croatia’s 
structural integration with its neighbors under collective security regimes.82 
Though the problems of Internally and Externally-Displaced Persons (IDP/EDP) 
are significant challenges, Croatia’s defense structures do not all discourage integration 
into collective security regimes.  In some ways, the nation has been singularly lucky.  
One example, which Dušan Reljič notes was Croatia’s exemption from France’s “Turkish 
Clause,” which would otherwise have delayed the nation’s bid for EU membership.83  A 
second example is the EU’s Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) system.  Though Croatia 
has yet to earn an invitation to join the EU, the EU’s adoption of the QMV system favors 
Croatian integration.  QMV, according to Reljič, will both clear the way for the accession 
of Croatia (if not already admitted by 2014), and will significantly enhance the small 
nation’s legislative impact if it has.84  Furthermore, though the challenge of repatriation 
greatly retards structural integration, Kuehne identifies the “Energy Treaty for South 
Eastern Europe” as an example where “sectoral expansion” has both preceded and 
promoted the integration of defense institutions.85  Many structural factors influence a 
nation’s integration into collective security regimes; only a few achieve that influence 
through altering public opinion. 
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1. Collective Defense: EU and NATO 
Of the five Croatian defense “impediments to reform” Bellamy identifies, four 
bear directly on the nation’s ability to integrate itself into collective security regimes:  an 
“absence of clear separation of powers between civilian and military authority,” a “legacy 
of politicization” within the MoD, a “lack of civilian defense expertise” and a 
corresponding “lack of developed non-governmental community.”86  The last of these is 
ironic, given the decisive role awarded to external consultant MPRI in the 2000 reform 
process. 
2. Convention Level 
Continued regional tensions in the Southwest Balkans during the late 1990s 
caught the region’s nations in a chicken-and-egg dilemma regarding EU and NATO 
membership.  Where the political will to join existed, nations such as Croatia could not 
meet the stability requirements for membership.  That membership, in turn, was key to 
providing stability.   In 1999, the European Union’s Secretariat created the Stability Pact 
to address that impasse.87   
The political strength of the Stability Pact lay in its clear association with EU 
membership.  Though designed merely as an ancillary to national Stabilization and 
Association Agreements (SAA) with the EU, the Stability Pact has grown to become the 
most influential convention-level collective security regime in the Western Balkans.  The 
Stability Pact’s combination of organization, resources and certifying authority for 
aspiring EU members created a means for institutional engagement that bypassed many 
of the roadblocks nations had encountered in fulfilling their SAAs.   As Bjorn Kuehne 
writes, the Stability Pact has grown from its original role of supporting stability to an 
active role as the regional “honest broker and matchmaker” between NATO, the World 
Bank and the EU.  Though the Pact lacks the military-to-military contact necessary for 
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institutional reform, its ability to tie infrastructure funding to specific reforms has 
allowed it to manage “excessive expectations” regarding the benefits of membership in 
the EU and NATO.88  As of February, the Stability Pact transitioned from an agreement 
to an organization in the form of the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC).89  Whereas 
the Stability Pact served as a surrogate to individual state Membership Action Plans 
(NATO) and Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA), funneling structural 
recommendations to aspiring EU and NATO member states, the RCC will be an active 
body that will articulate the common interests of regional states to the European 
Commission and the NATO International Military Staff. 
E. OPERATIONS 
Croatia has participated in United Nations Peace Support Operations since the 
earliest days of the Republic’s independence.  Initially, national participation consisted of 
token contributions of military observers, which has gradually expanded to include 
standing support to the UN’s Southeast Europe Cooperation Process (SEECP).  The 
Regional Cooperation Council, heir to the Stability Pact, now serves as the EU troika’s 
designated intermediary for coordinating regional participation in UN PKO.  Croatia 
plays a leadership role in the RCC through its contribution of personnel and budget.90 
F. NATIONAL CONCLUSION 
The Republic of Croatia’s history is the antithesis to the collective security 
concept.  Collective security is premised on international assistance; Croatia achieved its 
independence utterly unaided.  Collective security promotes the sharing of defense 
structures and practices; Croatia’s Army formed ad hoc and grew its structures 
organically.  Collective security is the realm of the professional soldier yet Croatia’s was 
an overwhelmingly volunteer force composed mostly from civilian volunteers. 
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Collective security regimes export the doctrines, laws and organizations of strong global 
powers; Croatia’s security structures were formed not by occupiers, but in defiance of 
occupation.  
Setting aside the moral proposition that the conflicts in Former Yugoslavia 
illustrate the human cost of collective security’s failure (and that of collective defense as 
well), the Republic of Croatia represents the counterpoint to any security concept based 
on international collaboration.  By all rights, Croatia ought to subscribe to a narrow 
definition of collective defense, one that addresses the shortcomings of the immediate 
past and commits the state only minimally beyond its core protective mission.  
Surprisingly, however, Croatia is among the most active proponents of collective 
security.  According to the Center for European Security Studies, the nation is an 
“exemplary active participant in every existing regional forum for cooperation.”91   
Croatia’s surprising support for collective security regimes of all types, especially 
in budgetary choices and operational contributions to regimes that operate far from the 
nation’s homeland defense mission, speak volumes about the keys to engagement with 
new partner nations.  Despite the EU and NATO’s multi-channel attempts to engage 
Croatia’s defense institutions, the nation’s objectives, attitudes, structures and operations 
did not adapt to a collective security concept until domestic political pressures forced 
them to.  Public opinion ultimately won the strategic battle against a recalcitrant defense 
hierarchy and a convoluted legal structure.  
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IV. REPUBLIC OF MONTENEGRO 
A. HISTORY 
1. Geography 
If geography influences a nation’s attitudes and options for international defense 
cooperation, Montenegro’s ought to hold some very stark prescriptions.  The nation’s 
location has made it an eyewitness to the transit of empires; its topography is the Balkan 
of Balkans.  Passage to (or from) Serbia in the Northeast or Kosovo in the East involves a 
meandering trip through a series of gorges.  High, seasonally impassible ridges mark the 
border with Herzegovina in the North.  In the South, the path into Albania leads down a 
wide valley, but one flanked by the imposing mountain from which the nation draws its 
name. To the West, seaborne access is like the punch line to the geological joke:  The 
Bay of Kotor’s deep water penetrates 30km inland, but through a series of ridges so 
forbidding they appear able, even without the coastal artillery perched on them, to chew 
up an amphibious assault.  To a greater extent even than the Alpine hinterlands of the 
Austrian Empire or Croatia’s two distinct regions, Montenegro’s geography has 
promoted a distinct national concept of collective security.   The nation has a coherent 
and enduring sense of national identity, but a long history of negotiation with foreign 
powers to maintain its sovereign independence. 
2. Pre-1878 
The bulk of Montenegro’s historical experience with collective security and 
collective defense has been devoted its most brutal form, empire.  In its early history, 
Montenegro grew territorially and coalesced culturally through its confederation with 
regional empires.  From Roman to Venetian, Byzantine to Ottoman, Russian to Austro-
Hungarian, empires have played a central role in the formation of Montenegrin identity, a 
culture that integrates as it defends.    
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In the extreme, the mythology surrounding Montenegro’s most famous folk hero, 
Petar Petrovich-Njegos, holds that Montenegro was the vanguard for all South Slav 
peoples and the Orthodox Church while the other kingdoms were under Ottoman 
subjugation.92  Ironically, the Montenegrin myth of perpetual independence, a 
Montenegro “never conquered by the Turks, never pacified by the Germans” figured 
prominently in Serbian propaganda opposing a Montenegrin independence referendum in 
2000.93   
While the Venetian and Austro Hungarian empire domination of Montenegro 
played significant roles in forming the state’s defense institutions that lasted through 
World War II, the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) entirely re-cast 
and enlarged those institutions.94  The most formative event in Montenegro’s modern 
history that continues to shape the nation’s approach to all aspects of collective 
security—government objectives, public attitudes, security structures and operations-- 
was the 1878 Treaty of Berlin.  At the stroke of its signing pen, the Berlin treaty created 
an independent kingdom of Montenegro as a diplomatic peer to Serbia and more than 
compensated for Montenegro’s earlier loss of territory under the Treaty of San Stefano.95   
A collective security regime, thereby, was responsible for creating the largest 
independent Montenegrin state in history.  Austria, Italy, Germany and Serbia’s 
subsequent failure to preserve Montenegro’s independence became a prominent feature 
of national identity that wasn’t set right until the nation’s independence in 2006.   The 
Treaty of Berlin explains Montenegro’s public advocacy and private ambivalence about 
collective security organizations. 
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3. Yugoslav Wars of Dissolution to Present 
While Montenegro only gained internationally recognized independence from 
Serbia in 2006, the social and political processes that led to independence from Serbia 
were well underway when Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia elected to leave the Federation.  
Albanian Historian Aldo Bumçi breaks Montenegrin history since the breakup of the 
SFRY into three periods:  a “dominant power politics” phase from 1992-1997, the “split 
with Slobodan Milošević” which took place between 1997 and 2001, and the “drive 
towards independence” which continued until the successful independence recognition in 
2006.96  Scrutiny of Montenegro’s recent history broken into Bumçi’s three time periods 
reveals that each era had a distinct impact on Montenegro’s current attitude toward 
collective security mechanisms. 
a. 1992-1997:  The Client State’s Last Gasp 
As a client state of Serbia throughout the 1990’s, Montenegro sidestepped 
the process of ethnic and religious partition that caused such grievous damage elsewhere 
in the Former Yugoslavia.  Ethnic differences existed, but five factors distinguished 
Montenegro from the other former Yugoslav republics, all of which hindered the war-
profiteering that fueled ethnic separatism:  First, Montenegro’s economy depended 
heavily on primary-commodity production.97  The vertical integration, fixed 
infrastructure and limited number of customers for Montenegro’s mines did not permit 
armed confiscation or regional division.  Gangsters in Montenegro would have to try a 
more gentrified approach.  “Self-Management Socialism,” which effectively dispersed 
political and commercial power in Slovenia and Croatia, in Montenegro functioned in 
name only.98  Political and commercial power rested in the hands of a relatively 
concentrated and ethnically homogenous elite at the time when the SFRY began to break 
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up.  Third, a large Yugoslav National Army (JNA) presence, dominated by Serb and 
Montenegrin-Serb command was positioned to quell any ethnic separatist movement.  
Fourth, Montenegro’s ethnic groups were physically interspersed.  In analogy to Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Montenegro’s ethnic map was more like integrated Sarajevo than 
homogenous Bihać.  Furthermore, ethnic Montenegrins had a long and stable history of 
negotiating their ethnic identity with Serbs.  Maj. Michael Tarquinto addressed the nature 
of that relationship in his 2005 Naval Postgraduate School thesis.99  While the two groups 
have never settled the question--whether Montenegrins are “coastal Serbs”100 or Serbs 
the ethnic progeny of Montenegrins101--their discord on the subject has a long history of 
adhering to cultural norms and non-violent channels.102    The fifth and final factor which 
discouraged ethnic division and molded the way Montenegrin’s approach collective 
security was the decisive influence of one man:  Slobodan Milošević.  The descendant of 
a prominent Montenegrin family, Milošević enjoyed widespread popularity in 
Montenegro in the early 1990s.  His status as president of the SFRY elevated 
Montenegro’s influence and forestalled public debate about the region’s ethnic distinction 
from Serbia.103  As other regions of Yugoslavia gained their independence, Milošević 
deliberately sought to strengthen his patronage links with government officials and 
industrial leaders in Montenegro.  His assistance to those leaders took the form of 
military support through the JNA and both direct and indirect bribes.  Mirroring the 
process taking place in Russia at the time, Milošević “privatized” many state-owned 
industries into the hands of their managers.104  That policy would ultimately become the 
basis for the high-level corruption cases examined below. 
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b. 1997-2001:  Slow-Walking Away from Belgrade 
Montenegro’s move toward independence was by no means 
unidirectional.  NATO’s 1999 air campaign in Kosovo, while successful in compelling 
Serbia to withdraw its troops there, overwhelmingly re-oriented the Montenegrin public 
toward union with the Yugoslav state’s remnant.  Operation Allied Force fused the 
association of NATO with United States unilateral foreign policy.  Montenegro’s citizens 
have yet to conceive of NATO as an Article V (collective defense) alliance.  While 
convincing Montenegro to seek NATO membership turns out to be a surmountable 
challenge, OAF cemented in the minds of many Montenegrins the belief that joining 
NATO amounts to a necessary but unpalatable trade of one illegitimate security regime 
for another.   
Where NATO fared worse in Montenegro’s public opinion for its 
campaign against the Milošević regime, the same campaign against the Yugoslav ruler 
significantly improved public awareness and attitudes toward the Hague.  The UN 
Tribunal’s engagement with Montenegro between 1997 and 2001, though it yielded few 
prosecutions other than Milošević’s, created a clear and positive image for collective 
security institutions in fighting transnational crime.  Serbian opposition leader Vojislav 
Kostunica’s evolving relationship with the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia paralleled the transformation of public attitudes in Montenegro.105  
Corruption and organized crime had been rampant throughout the 1990s; the Hague’s 
action against the King of the Untouchables provided the first hint of a reversal of that 
trend.  As the effort to prosecute Milošević gained political legitimacy and legal 
momentum in Serbia, so did the political consensus behind Filip Vujanovic’s presidency.  
Vujanovic gradually steered the Montenegrin parliament’s legislative agenda to 
overhauling existing defense institutions and negotiating with Serbia new forces for an 
independent Montenegro. 
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c. 2002-Present:  Defining the Terms of Independence 
Since 2001, Montenegro’s attitude toward collective security mechanisms 
has evolved based on optimism toward the United Nations, skepticism about the Stability 
Pact for Southeast Europe, a strong desire to join the European Union and an equally 
strong sense of resignation that joining NATO is a prerequisite to achieve the greater EU 
goal.  At the time of its freedom from Milošević, the political and economic structure of 
Montenegro was much narrower than that of the other federated states.  The acts and 
statements of a few party leaders masked the broader attitudes of the many.  As James 
Gow explains, the client state was not a one-party state.  Unlike in Serbia, Montenegro’s 
communist party since 1990 never held a majority of the popular support.106  After 1990, 
Montenegro never fought a struggle to maintain regime legitimacy because it the 
communists never had it.  The regime’s chassis rolled on wheels of personal patronage.  
When Milošević left for the Hague, the wheels fell off that cart. 
Ironically, the process that in 2006 resulted in Montenegro’s independence 
defies the conventional definition of “balkanization.”  Absent military pressure from 
Serbia and Milošević as the focal point for unionist Serbs, Montenegro did not decay into 
a set of regional or ethnic camps.  Instead, as Elizabeth Pond describes in Endgame in the 
Balkans, Prime Minister Vujanovic acted unilaterally, methodically and boldly.  
Capitalizing on a lack of Serbian consensus against Montenegrin independence, and 
without waiting for a domestic consensus favoring the same to emerge, Vujanovic pushed 
the European Union to establish an achievable voting standard for an independence 
referendum.  Largely because of Vujanovic’s early, sustained and public cooperation 
with the ICTY, the EU obliged.107   
B. GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES 
Of the three nations under consideration, Montenegro’s official intentions 
regarding collective security regimes are the most transparent.  This may be because 
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Montenegro’s government attitude toward membership in collective security 
organizations is the farthest removed from public opinion.  Croatia’s successful campaign 
for NATO membership showed a similar level of resolve, but based on a much more 
opaque process.  Austria’s foreign policy process is highly transparent, but with a strong 
resolve against membership.  
Government statements favoring membership in the EU and NATO, active 
participation in UN collective security agreements and bilateral cooperation programs 
with the United States all antedated Montenegrin independence.  At the April 2008 
NATO Bucharest Summit, Montenegro’s Prime Minister welcomed the nation’s 
invitation to participate in Intensified Dialogue and reaffirmed its intention to join the 
Alliance.  He also voiced full support for the Croatian and Albanian membership 
invitations.  
C. PUBLIC ATTITUDES 
In Montenegro, public attitudes toward collective security organizations reflect 
two common phenomena:  the ability to simultaneously support mutually incompatible 
conclusions and a strong social pressure to join groups.  Turning Groucho Marx’s desire 
“never to join a group that would have me as a member” on its head, Montenegro’s 
citizens aspire most strongly to membership in the groups that are hardest to join.  
Viewed individually, public attitudes toward specific collective security 
organizations do not rationally correspond to either recent historical experience nor the 
impact those organizations would likely have on Montenegro’s citizens.  Across the 
board, while aspirations for economic achievement and international commerce are high, 
attitudes toward collective security organizations are low.  Even the European Union, 
though it is more closely associated with economic achievement than NATO, does not 
score a majority approval rating.108     Yet despite their low popularity ratings, however, 
there is widespread consensus in Montenegro that joining both NATO and the EU are 
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inevitable outcomes.  In the cynical perspective of public opinion polls, alliances with 
collective security organizations are forged by unaccountable elites.  The reality of 
Montenegrin defense structures and operations largely confirms that conclusion. 
1. Toward NATO 
One of the greatest challenges for creating a strategy to engage public opinion on 
collective security is that the general public is not usually aware of its influence.  
Montenegrin citizen’s attitudes toward NATO reflect that common disconnect between 
perception of international organizations and the reality of their role.     
In 2002, the Stockholm-based Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
polled citizens throughout Southeast Europe to assess their attitudes toward collective 
security organizations and their preference for national engagement with those 
organizations.  The survey found that while there was widespread approbation for 
engagement with collective security regimes, they were viewed only as abstract means to 
economic ends.  Only 20 percent of the population perceived joining the EU and NATO 
as the best way for Montenegro to protect its security interests.  26.3 percent favored 
joining only the EU, and in contrast only 1 percent saw membership exclusively in 
NATO as the best path.109  Polling by the Center for Democratic Research (CEDEM), an 
independent Non-Governmental Organization based in Podgorica has produced similar 
results.  In CEDEM’s continual sampling of Montenegrin public opinion, NATO’s 
favorability rating was extremely low following NATO operations against Serbia in 
1999, rose to a peak of 44% the month of Montenegrin independence, then steadily 
decayed to a February 2008 level of only 29%.110 
Likewise, though NATO membership would have clear economic and lifestyle 
implications for Montenegrins, it is difficult to connect their daily lives with the Alliance.  
As Jelena Radoman of the Belgrade-based Western Balkan Security Observer concluded: 
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Contrary to the EU - perceived primarily as an economic and political 
community- NATO membership does not entail a clear and direct benefit 
for a Montenegrin citizen. He does not find the system of collective 
security understandable by itself, or as representing an obvious interest of 
the state.111 
In Radoman’s review of survey data, the strongest public factor which appeared to favor 
NATO was the widespread belief that Montenegro should follow the path of neighboring 
countries.  Now that Albania and Croatia have been accepted for membership, that social 
pressure is likely to intensify.  
2. Toward EU 
A 2007 Center for Democracy and Human Rights survey of public attitudes 
toward the EU suggests that the nature of public support for the EU may be more 
important than extent of that support.  Though public approval for joining the European 
Union hovered only around 50%, the overwhelming majority of responses indicated that 
Montenegrin’s accept an activist role of the EU in reforming government institutions 
prior to the nation’s accession.112  As indicated in the historical review, the EU played an 
early, active and transparent role in establishing criteria for Montenegrin law enforcement 
and defense reform cooperation.  The Vujanovic administration’s efforts to shepherd the 
EU acquis communitaire  (legal harmonization to EU standards) through the parliament 
have likewise met with little public resistance.   
D. SECURITY STRUCTURES 
In small states dependent on larger ones for their security, the decision-making 
power to form alliances and working arrangements to maintain security has historically 
been reserved for national leaders.  In fact, the forging of such relationships has been a 
core function of central government.  In general, the smaller the state, the more 
centralized the power.  Montenegro is an exception to that rule.  In Montenegro, the 
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formation of international ties to collective security arrangements that preserve the state’s 
independence has traditionally been an all-hands effort.  That tradition has not only 
continued, but expanded since Montenegro danced its 2006 Šota away from Serbia.  Both 
private individuals and government officials are central to the decisions that determine 
the working relationship between nation and collective security partners.  In the 
increasing influence of private actors, both social and commercial, Montenegro is the 
vanguard of a growing trend throughout Europe.  
1. Government Structures 
a. Legal Infrastructure for Collective Security 
As with many aspects of Montenegro’s foreign policy, the scale and 
sophistication of Montenegro’s interaction with NATO far exceeds the nation’s size and 
length of independence.  Montenegro preceded its independence with a broad second-
track program of engagement with collective security institutions, including NATO.  In 
fact, Montenegro’s success in peacefully achieving independence from the SFRY owes 
strongly to its adept policy of engagement with collective defense partners.  National 
leaders who favored independence were unsure how negatively the Serbian government 
would react to a successful independence referendum.  Convincing the European Union 
to mediate the process and Belgrade to accept the same was one strategy that reduced the 
chance of conflict.  A decade-long policy of integrating NATO partners into its civil 
defense infrastructure was another.  Such overt engagement diplomacy both increased the 
likelihood (the words ‘security guarantee’ are deliberately avoided here) that if Serbia 
attempted to check the independence movement through force of arms NATO would 
assist.113 Montenegro joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace immediately upon its 
independence in 2006 and on April 3rd, 2008 was invited to participate in the “Intensified 
Dialogue (ID),” which for prior candidate nations within two years has translated to an 
invitation to join NATO. 
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b. Convention Level 
  Montenegro’s most prominent defense relationship with a convention-
level collective security regime is its participation in the UN-Sponsored Small Arms and 
Light Weapons (SALW) program.  According to the Ministry of Defense, "Montenegro 
has committed to complying with all appropriate UN and OSCE agreements and 
mechanisms relating to the Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Program."  In 
compliance with the program, Montenegro signed an agreement with the OSCE on 18 
April 2007 providing for UN-funded assistance in destroying 9900 metric tons of 
conventional ammunition, 128 tons of propellant, 25 tons of Napalm located in Kotor 
Bay and at the Podgorica Airport.  The OSCE document on Small Arms and Light 
Weapons is an anti-trafficking effort based on the voluntary participation of member 
countries.  Though it is not legally a convention, its structure of multiple bilateral 
Memoranda of Understanding makes it the functional equivalent.114 
c. Voluntary / Bilateral 
Montenegro has eagerly sought out bilateral cooperation programs as part 
of its effort to demonstrate compatibility with the EU and NATO.  This has included 
participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative and numerous technical agreements.   
An example of a large bilateral cooperation program is the December, 2007 US – 
Montenegro Technical Agreement for homeland security training.  According to US press 
releases, Montenegro has participated in several similar bilateral agreements, even pre-
dating the nation’s independence from Serbia.  In 2004, after Montenegrin police 
assumed responsibility for border enforcement, the United States and Montenegro 
conducted joint border training.  In December, the United States and Montenegro signed 
                                                 
114  "Capacity Development Programme for SALW (Conventional Weapons)"," United Nations 
Development Programme, www2.undp.org.yu—Annex A ProDoc Hazardous Waste Disposal FINAL.pdf 
<http://www2.undp.org.yu/montenegro/ijr/projects/Montenegro%20Demilitarization/Annex%20A%20Pro
Doc%20Hazardous%20Waste%20Disposal%20FINAL.pdf> (accessed 29 March 2008).United States Navy 
NTIP, “Naval Treaty Implementation Program - SALW"," www.ntip.navy.mil 
<http://www.ntip.navy.mil/> (accessed 09 March 2008). 
 60
a bilateral agreement to coordinate the destruction of SA-7 portable surface to air 
missiles, cluster munitions, torpedoes and mines.115 
d. United Nations 
Montenegro showed little delay in joining voluntary collective security 
mechanisms following its Summer 2006 Declaration of Independence.  In December of 
that year, it signed a "Standard Basic Assistance Agreement (SBAA)" with the United 
Nations Development Programme, which pledged broad support for UN demilitarization 
programs.   
Elsewhere in the United Nations structure of voluntary regimes, 
Montenegro has been less aggressive.   Among the voluntary groups founded under UN 
Security Council Resolution 1540, Montenegro’s participation has been mixed.  As of 
March, 2008, Montenegro is not yet a member of the Zangger Committee, Australia 
Group or the Waasenaar Arrangement.  It did participate in a working group meeting in 
2004, but has not subsequently reaffirmed its commitment to Waasenaar since 
independence.  Montenegro is currently a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, 
Missile Technology Control Regime and the Southeast Europe Clearinghouse.116 
  
2. Private Level Structures 
a. Commercial 
In many countries, foreign ownership of companies and the desire to 
attract foreign investment has a significant influence on the formation of foreign policy. 
In Montenegro, the role of multi-national corporations is so large, it may eclipse the 
decision-making power of government.  In an Austrian Diplomatic Academy Study 
found, for example, that Montenegro’s largest mine is under the control of an Austrian-
                                                 
115  Embassy of the United States, Podgorica Montenegro, "Press Release: "U.S. and Montenegro 
Conclude Technical Agreement on Small Weapons Destruction Program"," Department of State, United 
States of America, http://podgorica.usembassy.gov/ministry-of-defense.html (accessed 29 March 2008). 
116 Zangger, Australia Group, Waasenaar, NSG, MTCR, SEEC websites. 
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based multinational corporation (MNC).   To contend with the effects of such structural 
imbalances, the European Union is creating its own regional defense planning 
infrastructure that creates a working relationship between MNCs and the EU akin to the 
US Department of Commerce regulation of foreign ownership in defense related 
companies.117 
b. Social  
Montenegro’s social identity and international social ties demonstrate the 
frustrating futility of trying to define any Balkan nation as a cultural monolith.  Religious 
leaders play a significant role in defining the social acceptance or rejection of 
international structures.  Upon completion of Montenegro’s Referendum on 
Independence, the Montenegrin Orthodox church immediately declared its own 
independence from the Serbian Orthodoxy.118 
E. OPERATIONS 
The three rounds of NATO accession have led to a tendency to seek parallels 
between countries.  Montenegro is a reminder that such parallels are not always feasible 
or desirable.  While some elements of participation in collective security regimes can be 
scaled down, and while growing collective security regimes across the board have 
improved in their ability to assess comparative advantage and find an appropriate role for 
member countries, there is an absolute lower limit for some types of military forces.  
Montenegro has been eager to project the image of an international contributor to 
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and Peace Support Operations (PSO).   
Montenegro’s desire to validate its UN membership and to create the option of 
joining NATO and the EU has led to a foreign policy that aggressively seeks participation 
                                                 
117 Auer, “Waasenaar Arrangement: Export Control and its Role in Strengthening International 
Security.” Vienna, Austria: Diplomatische Akademie Wien, 2005. 
118  D. Tanturovski and others, "Differences and Similarities in Reproduction and its Control 
Determined by Religious Orientation," European Journal of Contraception & Reproductive Health Care 9 
(June 2004), 72, 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=665074801&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD 
(accessed 02 May 2008).. 
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in international collective security operations.  As indicated above, however, serious 
structural problems limit the VCG-Vojske Crne Gore’s expeditionary capability.  To 
begin with, from the time of the nation’s Referendum on Independence (May, 2006) until 
March of this year, it was not even certain that Montenegro would elect to preserve a 
standing army.119   
1. NATO 
While the March “law on participation in allied missions” guarantees 
Montenegro’s hypothetical participation in Out of Area missions, there is no guarantee ( 
legislative or otherwise) that the nation will possess the number and type of troops 
necessary to contribute to Article 8 operations.   Currently, the VCG’s size, equipment 
and training do not permit the force or its Interior Ministry and Border Police 
counterparts from to follow Georgia and Ukraine’s example through participation in 
NATO operations under Partnership for Peace auspices.120 
2. European Union 
Montenegro’s primary priority to join the European Union reflects in its 
cooperation with EU collective security operations such as EUROPOL.  As Montenegro 
has discovered, prosecuting transnational crime can be a double-edged sword.  A series 
of prosecutions of high-level Montenegrin officials for transnational criminal activities, 
starting in 2002, simultaneously raised public confidence regarding President 
Djukanovic’s willingness to take on organized crime interests and public doubt regarding 
how pervasive that criminal activity might be.121  In terms of financial cost and political 
resistance, police reform and anti-crime operations may turn out to be more expensive 
                                                 
119  Republic of Slovenia Public Communication Office, “Defence Minister Promises Montenegro Aid 
in NATO Bid'," Government Communication Office, Republic of Slovenia, 
http://www.ukom.gov.si/eng/slovenia/publications/slovenia-news/6158/6186/ (accessed 29 March 2008). 
120  NATO Backgrounder: Partners in the Southern Caucasus (Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization,[2007]), http://www.nato.int/docu/caucasus/southern_caucasus_partners-e.pdf 
(accessed 02April 2008). 
121  Tarquinto and Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.), Serbia and Montenegro : Together Forever Or 
One-Night Stand? [Electronic Resource], 39. 
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than military reform.  In Montenegro, two factors favor that conclusion.  First, 
international partners share a large share of the cost for destroying military equipment an 
facilities.  Second, since the command structure of Montenegrin military units 
traditionally ran to Belgrade, not Podgorica, those military interests do not tend to be as 
entrenched in Montenegro’s government as they do in Croatia and other parts of the 
SFRY.   Pursuing organized crime, however, involves the prosecution of individuals who 
frequently have strong government connections.  It is a task to be undertaken more 
carefully.  It remains to be seen whether the European Union will provide the appropriate 
level of resources, and whether Vujanovic will have enough political capital to continue 
the prosecution of transnational crime. 
3.  Proliferation Security Initiative 
Montenegro has accepted the Proliferation Security Initiative Statement of 
Principles and taken part in the joint exercise “Adriatic Gate 2007”122  While the exact 
extent of national participation is unknown, the United States and other NATO countries 
have consistently called upon Montenegro to improve prosecution of money laundering 
activities which have the potential for ties to nuclear proliferation networks. 
4. United Nations Stabilization Program 
Well prior to Montenegro’s Independence Referendum, with the acquiescence of 
the Serbian government, Montenegro began seeking to participate in United Nations 
Stabilization Program operations.  This cooperation culminated in "Montenegro has 
committed to complying with all appropriate UN and OSCE agreements and mechanisms 
relating to SALW" In compliance with the program, Montenegro signed an agreement 
with the OSCE on 18 April 2007 providing for UN-funded assistance program to destroy 
9900 metric tons of conventional ammunition, 128 tons of propellant, 25 tons of Napalm 
located in Kotor Bay and at the Podgorica Airport.  The OSCE document on Small Arms 
and Light Weapons is an anti-trafficking effort based on the voluntary participation of 
                                                 
122  Embassy of the United States Seoul, Korea, “U.S. Security Initiative Draws More Participants"," 
http://seoul.usembassy.gov/410_053107.html (accessed 03 April 2008). 
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member countries.  Though it is not legally a convention, its structure of multiple 
bilateral Memorandums of Understanding makes it the functional equivalent. 
5. United Nations  Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) 
To date, Montenegro’s force structure has not permitted beyond a token level of 
participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations.  In 2001, Montenegrin police took part in a 
joint mission with Serbia to support UN PKO in Timor L’Este.  Subsequently, the 
nation’s soldiers have been deployed in support of the UN monitoring mission in 
Liberia.123 
F. NATIONAL CONCLUSION 
No concept more perfectly distills the Montenegrin attitude toward collective 
security than the notion of a ‘security entrepreneur.’124   A combination of four factors: 
• limited military resources; 
• economic structure that perpetuates dependence on a few trading partners; 
• negative historical experience with international security mechanisms; and 
• a strong cultural identity that transcends ethnic lines  
makes Montenegro a nation that defines security in extremely defensive terms.   
Montenegro owes its independence to the practice of assessing and balancing regional 
powers while promoting a clear sense of its own identity.  
 Beyond its own interests, Montenegro lies sandwiched between three nation’s 
whose survival depends upon their stable interaction with collective security 
organizations.  In both Bosnia and Kosovo, those organizations form the backbone of 
government.  In Serbia, domestic political forces require the simultaneous pursuit of two  
                                                 
123  "UN Envoy Decorates UNMIL Serbia and Montenegro Police Contingent with UN Peacekeeping 
Medals " United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UN Mission in Liberia, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmil/pr47.pdf (accessed 23 March 2008). 
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contradictory tracks.  While Serbia’s government pursues a public policy of confrontation 
over Kosovo, it simultaneously seeks to curry favorable opinion in Western Europe for 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 67
V. CONCLUSION 
From the narrow perspective of international security institutions, many are the 
reasons to demote Southeast Europe in the priorities of focus in 2008:  Larger conflicts 
and calamities loom in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and South America loom.  The bulk 
of NATO’s resources for expeditionary operations are committed to ISAF in 
Afghanistan.  US forces that might otherwise augment NATO missions are committed in 
Iraq.  Beyond the scarcity of resources, the security situation in Southeast Europe is calm 
compared to what it was a decade prior.  The genocidal catastrophe that demolished 
Yugoslavia has burned to embers now only a few thousand troops are sufficient to tend.  
Even the crisis surrounding Kosovo’s February 2008 independence declaration is a minor 
security exercise compared to the challenges of pacifying and administering Afghanistan.  
The greatest source of threat and uncertainty in the 1990s, Serbia, has now only a fraction 
of its former military power.  Proponents of collective security organizations, however, 
would be ill served to allow the crush of events to constrict and divert their approach to 
the Western Balkans and Central Europe.  Not in spite of, but because of heavy military 
commitments elsewhere, Europe’s collaborative security mechanisms must learn to 
recruit, to engage and to effectively incorporate the nations of this region. 
The common and idiosyncratic traits of Austrian, Croatian and Montenegrin 
engagement with collective security demonstrate both the need for precision and the cost 
of imprecision.  As the proponents of collective security reach out to new partners, the 
accuracy of their understanding of national motivations will determine the success of 
integration.  In an era of spiraling costs and escalating commitments, a lack of savvy 
regarding national objectives expectations and capabilities poses two risks:  It may leave 
the nations of Southeast Europe beggars at the banquet, unable to afford the tools of 
Transformation.  Worse, it threatens to weaken collective security regimes by bringing 
under the same tent members who hold incoherent and incompatible concepts of alliance. 
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A. COMMON TRAITS 
A review of the three case studies, scrutinizing separately their objectives, 
attitudes, structures and operations relevant to collective security yields several common 
traits. 
1. Objectives 
Current efforts to recruit and reform NATO Partner countries in Southeast Europe 
operate from a primitive and often inaccurate understanding of why the nations in the 
region accept collective security.  Austria seeks an active role in collective security 
institutions and operations, but no longer primarily as a proxy for the rivalry between 
NATO and the European Union.  Croatia no longer seeks membership in NATO out of a 
primary need to achieve Article V protection from a Serbian threat.  The threats that 
today drive Montenegro to seek membership in collective security regimes are mostly 
effects of transnational crime that spill over from neighbors.  Ironically, some of those 
neighbors are likely to precede Montenegro into NATO. 
Among the three case studies, one common thread in their objectives toward 
collective security was the strong and primary linkage to economic achievement.  For 
better or worse, throughout Southeast Europe, participation in all international security 
institutions is seen as a military means to an economic end.  Entry into the European 
Union is the priority; geo-strategic concerns are subordinate to that goal.  The 1990s saw 
the proliferation of a range of collective security instruments that encouraged each nation 
to custom-tailor its commitments.  In this region, however, the net effect of that 
proliferation has been a blurring of distinctions.  In the current collective security regimes 
active in Central and Southeast Europe, the United Nations works for NATO, NATO for 
the EU and in some cases the EU for the United Nations.  This that blurring has erased 
the distinction between those who favor an EU centered versus a NATO-centered 
collective defense architecture.  In its place, it leaves nations in only two categories:  
those who seek the economic benefits of EU membership at all cost and those who prize 
national autonomy over regional integration.  Of the three case studies in this project, all 
of them have chosen the former.   
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Having resolved to promote collective security integration as a means to EU 
membership, national governments must then contend with a more difficult challenge, to 
assess public opinion and achieve the greatest permissible level of participation under the 
domestic political constraints.   
2. Attitudes 
Austria, Croatia and Montenegro demonstrate the malleability of public attitudes 
toward collective security, and the strong role institutional identity plays in shaping those 
attitudes.  While the specific histories of the three nations are distinct, they bear common 
traits.  For all three, the disintegration of Yugoslavia created strong and negative 
associations with specific collective security regimes.  NATO, the UN and the nascent 
EU failed to intervene in a timely and decisive fashion when nationalist conflicts in 
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina loomed.  This failure to act created an attitude of 
cynicism toward all three institutions that prevails to this day.  NATO’s 1999 intervention 
in Kosovo, far from redeeming that cynicism, reinforced the public perception of NATO 
as a tool of Machtpolitik.  If the distinction in public attitudes toward collective defense 
versus collective security institutions and toward treaties versus voluntary working 
groups were hazy in 1991, the two decades of Yugoslavia’s agony have done little to 
clarify them.  The web of working arrangements and regional initiatives that link 
established security institutions has so blurred the public understanding of relationships 
and identities, public opinion in all three countries has largely reverted to a mix of 
cynicism and suspicion.  Instead of disabusing Southeast European citizens of their 
beliefs that NATO is a proxy for the United States, the EU a proxy for Germany and 
France, the interweaving of collective security regimes in the three countries has 
reinforced a prevailing public opinion that Europe’s future will be divided only into two 
groups:  members and non-members.  
Public opinion is malleable; however the factors that influence it are increasingly 
far removed from government control.  Dušan Reljić, in observing Bosnian and Kosovar 
attempts to join the EU, asserted that “politicizing and mythologizing Europe by political 
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elites…is slowly down the speed of Europeanisation” of partner nations’ societies.125  
Now that the majority of Western Balkan states have established Membership Action 
Plans with NATO and Stabilization and Association Agreements with the European 
Union, national engagement with collective security institutions has begun to broaden 
from an exercise for political elites to a broader dialogue between public opinion and 
multinational institutions.  Only now can the harder debate begin, the task of establishing 
how much the region’s voters are willing to sacrifice in the service of collective defense 
and collective security. 
3. Structures 
Despite the avid debate of the 1990s which cast Europe’s security dilemma as a 
choice between collective security and collective defense, both systems can comfortably 
coexist.  States can simultaneously subscribe to both types of security regimes, and the 
regimes themselves can morph from one into the other. In Alliance Maintenance and 
Management in the 21st Century, John Deni provides one example of such 
transformation:  The Schonbrunn Convention between Russia, Germany and Austria 
began as a collective defense agreement and transformed into a collective security 
regime, the “Alliance of the Three Emperors.”  The latter regime established the working 
relationship among the Great Powers in the Balkans until the system’s abject failure 
caused World War I. 126  Southeast Europe since 1991 has traced that Schonbrunn history 
in reverse. The ugliest decades of the 20th century saw the Balkans atomize into small 
cultural regions.  Marshal Tito’s imperfect collective security arrangement, the SFRY, 
disemboweled itself.  At the conclusion of the conflict, however, the resulting states have 
begun to re-forge ties based on collective defense interests:  anti-terrorism, transnational 
crime and energy security.  Whether one model ultimately predominates throughout 
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Europe, at a minimum the examples of Austria, Croatia and Montenegro demonstrate that 
the ‘either/or’ debate does not adequately capture the priorities of some NATO 
Partnership states.   
Another prevailing theme in the Western literature in the 1990s--an attitude of 
skepticism pervaded regarding the ability of former communist states to transform their 
militaries into contributing members of international alliances--is not borne out by the 
Croatian and Montenegrin examples.  As recently as 2003, a RAND corporation study 
concluded that "Macedonia, Croatia and Albania...have a long way to go before they 
qualify for NATO membership." 127  Whether the Balkan nations made rapid progress 
over the intervening years, or NATO simply revised its standards to reflect a decline in 
the ‘willingness of the coalitions,’ the change indicates a need to understand better what 
partner nations hope to gain from membership in alliances.   
The three case studies also provide a counterpoint to Vedran Dzihič’s conclusion 
regarding Macedonia, Bosnia and Kosovo.  Dzihič asserts the European Union’s “formal-
technical” approach to integration, which focuses on institutional and legal reform, is 
inappropriate for new member states because it does not adequately promote the 
representation of minority populations in collective security structures.128  While each of 
the nations faces transnational security challenges related to its minority populations, 
those challenges are not the primary determinant of public attitudes toward collective 
security. 
The European Security Strategy’s claim that the EU has a comparative advantage 
(over NATO, the OSCE and United Nations) in the “range of civil and military 
instruments it can bring to bear on a conflict” does not stand out as starkly in the Balkans 
as elsewhere on Europe’s periphery.129  The wide range of collective security regimes at 
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work in Southeast Europe provides even small nations with a similar range of civil and 
military instruments.  In fact, the convoluted structure of reporting relationships places 
the EU, NATO and United Nations rotationally under each other’s command.  In the 
process, it blurs the relationship between collective defense, collective security and less 
formal means of collaboration.  In such an environment, states that remain widely 
engaged and have a coherent agenda can achieve impact in collective security regimes 
that far outstrips their population, defense budget or ability to contribute to operations.   
a. Legacy Problems 
While the most significant challenges for the transformation of Partnership 
forces are cultural, conceptual and political, legacy structural problems remain.  As 
NATO’s Brigadier General Gerhard Shultz notes, the German national experience was 
the need to transform from a defensive force based on the logistical assumptions of a 
homeland defense scenario to an expeditionary force capable of working in other climates 
and in a constant inter-service environment.130 
b. Problems of Scale 
The problem of inadequate staff resources to address integration 
challenges is not unique to small partner countries.  As Phil Kearley, Joint Staff J9, Joint 
Forces Command notes, even the United States, with the luxury of a large overall defense 
bureaucracy, faces bottlenecks in some mission, planning and liaison areas.  These 
problems are especially acute in civilian departments that serve auxiliary defense roles, 
such as the State Department Foreign Service and the Agency for International 
Development.131 
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c. The Proliferation of Channels 
The result of the proliferation in channels of negotiation between national 
governments and collective security regimes is not necessarily negative.  While it is easy 
to discount them as cynical attempts to re-negotiate previous commitments and 
circumvent discussion of politically unpalatable realities, they can serve a few real and 
constructive purposes.  The proliferation of channels can allow government negotiators to 
parse controversial issues into small components, which can be circulated separately 
among national parliamentary delegations.  The value of that process is not only in 
"slicing the salami" to find the maximum common position among party fractions, but in 
the fact that it can break the automatic association between particular issues.   
In all three states NATO’s administrative and operational decisions have 
very specific political connotations.  Political parties tend to react to NATO International 
Military Staff proposals in predictable fashion, often with more regard to source than to 
content.  A proposal may meet with a completely different response if it is filtered 
through the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council than if it is routed to the UN Security 
Council, European Commission or North Atlantic Council via the Regional Cooperation 
Council or any of the other partner organizations at work regionally in the Balkans.  The 
downside of such proliferation is that it tends to blur lines of accountability and poses the 
risk that nations will engage with a collective security regime but later unilaterally re-
negotiate their commitments based on a change in perception of the intermediary's 
character. 
d. Challenges of Military Transformation 
All three nations provide specific organizational examples that confirm 
Adam Stulberg and Michael Salomone’s assessment that military transformation to 
integrate into international security arrangements is most likely to succeed when three 
criteria are met:  a "strong national sense of mission, a progressive attitude towards 
experimentation and where commanders do not have incentives to monitor intrusively 
and sub-units do not have incentives to shirk directives for change."   While each of the 
three nations has examples of both success in and resistance to military reform, the 
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common pattern confirms that defense structures and units that existed during the 
communist era are more resistant to transformation in support of collective security 
regimes than are those which governments created after post-Cold War democratic 
reforms were complete.132 
4. Operations 
In the realm of collective security operations, all three case studies share the same 
two traits.  First, each of the nations has sought to make an operational contribution that 
exceeds the proportion of military and financial resources they are able to contribute to 
alliance.  While the methods of participation are nationally distinct—Austria providing 
considerable logistical support in place of combat troops, Croatia through spreading a 
small cadre of deployable troops across a wide range of UN, EU and NATO operations, 
and Montenegro by hosting international exercises—their objective is fundamentally the 
same.  The second trait in common between the three case studies is an attempt to 
achieve a leadership role in regional collective security mechanisms that exceeds their 
proportion of financial resources devoted to the cause.  A cynical observer might ascribe 
to those actions a desire to substitute diplomatic engagement for substantive contribution, 
but given the meager national financial resources available for contribution, that may be 
the only realistic option available to local governments. 
B. IDIOSYNCRATIC TRAITS 
1. Austria: “Otherness” and Identity 
Michal Koran's discussion of the Austrian neutrality concept examines the role of 
German "otherness" in defining the Austrian Republic's identity.  Koran asserts that the 
nation's perceived need to distinguish itself from Germany after World War II, while 
formative, did not provide a sufficient basis to explain the affirmative Austrian concept of 
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national identity. 133   In Austria, the need to participate actively in collective security 
regimes is central to the national concept of neutrality.   The same is not true for Croatia 
and Montenegro.   Croatia shares with postwar Austria a strong impulse to define itself in 
contrast to its former self and former foes, and furthermore both nations are forced to rely 
heavily on a tacit security guarantee from NATO.  In contrast to Austria, however, 
Croatia has no buffer zone separating it from potential threats to its territorial integrity, 
and therefore seeks to formalize its the Article V protection as quickly as possible.  
Montenegro, in contrast to the other two nations, has arrived at a concept of 
independence unique in Central Europe.  It derives neither from cultural distinction 
(Montenegrins see neither estrangement nor treason in their legal independence from 
kindred Serbia), nor from a common-defense relationship with NATO.  The varying 
experiences of the three case studies suggest that the sources of a nation’s identity 
determine both how and how deeply a nation will embrace the concept of collective 
security. 
2. Croatia: Towed by Public Opinion 
NATO’s newest invitee has undergone dramatic institutional reform in the past 
seven years, but the most distinct trait that impacts its national engagement with 
collective security is the Croatian public’s ability to compartmentalize divergent 
priorities.  Croatia’s defense infrastructure has achieved a remarkable level of 
interoperability with a range of collective security regimes, from NATO, to EU, to 
OSCE, despite a convoluted legal structure and often contradictory guidance on strategy.  
3. Montenegro:  Seeking Reward for Europe’s ‘Security Entrepreneurs’ 
Montenegro's experience bears out Stulburg and Salomone's contention that a 
strong "reciprocal flow of information" between commercial contractors and government 
ministries will "foster security entrepreneurship on both sides."   The heavy role of multi-
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national corporations has provided both a strong demand signal and an organized means 
for Montenegrin defense policy to be redirected toward regional and international 
collective security regimes. Montenegro's experience also bears out Stulburg and 
Salomone's conclusion that a strong corporate role in transformation can "compound the 
managerial challenge [of defense transformation] by providing cover for recalcitrant 
agents."134  Thus far, the role of commercial actors in Montenegro's military 
transformation has weighed heavily in favor of engagement with collective security 
organizations, but it leaves open the possibility that the nation’s government will have 
difficulty controlling the effects of that engagement on its domestic institutions. 
C.  IMPLICATIONS FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY INSTITUTIONS 
NATO as an organization and the United States as a promoter of integration 
should make a serious and sustained attempt to understand the true reasons why citizens 
in the region truly want to join the alliance. 
The process of fully engaging the Western Balkans and Austria in Europe’s 
collective security regimes is not merely a matter of filling in the blank spaces on the map 
between current NATO members.  Beyond seeking membership in NATO and the EU, 
convincing Southeast European nations to contribute actively to collective security 
operations will require a considerable shift in mindset and an increase in sophistication.  
As with Europe’s Eastern boundaries, the integration of Balkan states into collective 
security regimes will require NATO’s proponents to understand better why those states in 
particular seek international solutions for transnational security problems.  Convincing 
voters in those nations to support NATO’s collective defense mission, specifically for 
out-of-area operations, will involve a yet-further leap of public diplomacy.  The challenge 
of preserving a coherent identity and consistent missions for Europe’s collective security 
institutions may be greater than any external political pressure.  Starting at Vienna and 
continuing Southeast for hundreds of kilometers sits the most challenging laboratory for 
addressing these challenges. 
                                                 
134  Stulberg, Salomone and Long, Managing Defense Transformation : Agency, Culture and Service 
Change, 196. 
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The Austrian, Croatian and Montenegrin examples suggest that current EU and 
NATO efforts to integrate new partners are in two ways misguided:  They fail in their 
methodology and they display nationally inappropriate priorities.  The weakness in 
prioritization is a failure to recognize the greatest security challenges and priorities for 
Central and Southeast European nations.  In the absence of a large regional military 
power, and given the limited resources of such alliance partners, attempts to promote 
membership and participation in collective security regimes on the basis of global threats 
ring hollow.  Austria, Croatia and Montenegro do not seek membership in collective 
security regimes primarily out of concern for terrorism, but from a need to be included in 
the Western community of economically secure states.  Furthermore, the experience of 
these three states suggests their governments and voting public will not be content to 
merely seek out a small niche for contribution to out-of-area operations under any 
collective security regime.  Rather, their simultaneous membership in a set of collective 
security regimes must address the immediate threats of transnational crime, corruption 
and a loss of sovereignty to social networks of expatriates, often from their neighboring 
countries.  To integrate previously non-aligned states and new democracies substantively 
into collective security regimes will require a more accurate assessment of the threats 
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